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"SABRETACHE"

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The Life and Work of Rev. Arthur Edward Forbes, DCM, ED, (1881-1946)

by REV. A.E.E. BOTTRELL

WHEN a blue-eyed, fair haired boy was born to William Joseph Kirnshaw Forbes and Martha Forbes, both originally from Middlesex, England, on December 4 1881, at South Brisbane, they named him Arthur Edward. His primary schooling took place at local educational centres.

On the committal of Queensland to the war in South Africa as an ally of Great Britain, Arthur Forbes at the age of 19 years enlisted in the Queensland 3rd Mounted Infantry as Bugler No.297 from his home in Agnes Street, Torwood: stating that his occupation was that of a photographer. The bugler was one of the last five men posted.

As Officer Commanding, Major W.H. Tunbridge had a force of 14 officers, 302 others with 406 horses.

In South Africa the company became the 2nd Regiment in the "Bushmen's Brigade" of Colonel Plumer's Column that assisted in the Relief of Mafeking.

On the eve of embarkation on the transport *Duke of Cornwall* in Brisbane Harbour, the parade was addressed by Acting Commandant Colonel Lyster and Lieutenant-Governor Sir Samuel Griffith.

A silver bugle was given the company by Miss Macarthey from the bush girls of the State.

The YMCA also gave a copy of the New Testament to each soldier.

The vessel sailed from the harbour on March 1, 1900, and the troops disembarked at Cape Town on April 2, 1900.

Such was the materialisation of the "Proclamation, February 9, 1900, a third "Military Force of Volunteers" was authorised, constituting the 4th and 5th Companies, Queensland Mounted Infantry".

For return to Australia the force left South Africa on the transport *Moray shire* on May 9, 1901, landed at Sydney on June 7 where they entrained on June 12 and arrived in Brisbane the following day.

The veterans received a most vociferous welcome from a great host of loved ones, friends and well-wishers.

On June 15, 1901, and 11 days before the unit was disbanded, according to a report in the *Brisbane Courier* on 17th, the Governor and Lady Lamington were present at a presentation of medals to 111 members of the 3rd Mounted Infantry awarded them by the Imperial Government. The venue was Victoria Barracks, Brisbane.

On this same day a Mr Edward H. Macarthey had written an article for the *Brisbane Courier* setting out the circumstances under which Bugler A.E.

Forbes had won the Distinguished Conduct Medal during a severe skirmish in the Boer War on Sunday July 22, 1900. But full recognition of this noble feat is given by E.L. Wallace in his book, "The Australians at the Boer War", and much more so by Lt.-Col. P.L. Murray in the Official Records, 1911 pp 465 and 473.

In this last book the author quoted the report to the Colonial Secretary, Brisbane, August 17, 1901, of Captain R.B. Echlin, Officer Commanding "B" Squadron, 3rd Queensland Mounted Infantry:

> **"The most notable act of bravery, not actually observed by me, but of which I have ample evidence, was that of Bugler Forbes. This lad, then about 16 years old, took my horse and his own to what was supposed to be cover, behind a deserted farm house, and held those horses until they were both shot. During that trying time he had a bullet sent through his haversack.**
> **"Forbes, with the other horse-holders, were compelled to take shelter in this farm house; and when, with the continuous fire kept up by its occupants, ammunition commenced to run short, Forbes under fire went out amongst the shot horses and ransacked the saddle wallets. A Mr Foy, a war correspondent of a West Australian newspaper, was one of those who took shelter in the farm house, and in writing to his journal particularly referred to Forbes' action."**

Underneath this citation are also the words: "Bugler Forbes was mentioned in despatches and awarded the DCM" Despatches. "297, Forbes, Arthur Edward, Bugler, DCM Despatches, London Gazette, 27-9-1901".

Two hundred and seventy Australians served in this savage action, of which 70 were Queenslanders. The rest of the men were from New South Wales, Victoria and West Australia. Casualties amounted to 59.

One result of the bugler's decoration was the presentation to himself of a silver-mounted bugle and a purse of 63 gold sovereigns from the admiring people of Brisbane by the first Governor-General of Australia, Lord Hopetoun, in September, 1901. Forbes gave the gold tribute to his mother, an earnest Christian woman.

But the campaigns on South Africa continued apace and the call to arms resounded for A.E. Forbes, DCM. He enlisted in the 1st Australian Commonwealth Horse (Queensland) as Bugler No 867. The unit was known as "D" Company in 1AC/WH and under command of Lt.-Col. J.S. Lyster. The company had seven officers, 116 others, with 124 horses. Volunteers accepted were good horsemen and able shots. For privates, gunners and buglers the pay rate was five shillings a day with all personal and Army equipment supplied.

"D" Company left Brisbane by train for Sydney on January 26, 1902, and embarked on the transport *Custodian* at Sydney on February 18, 1902. The date of arrival at South Africa is unknown. The company took part in driving operations in Western Transvaal under Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton, who received a telegram (a rare gesture from Supreme Command) from Lord Kitchener.."Capital result. Tell troops I highly appreciate their exertions and consider result very satisfactory".

The Company embarked at Durban on the transport *Drayton Grange* for home on July 11, 1902, reached Brisbane on August 13, 1902, to be disbanded on August 19.

During these two duty stints in the South African war Bugler Forbes was in the battle zones of the Transvaal,

Rhodesia, Cape Colony and the Orange Free States.

Becoming conscious of a "call" to a full-time ministry in the Church, Forbes journeyed to Scotland to spend some years in the Glasgow Bible Institute as a theological student.

On graduation from the College he was ordained for the (Baptist) ministry and returned to Brisbane. Under the Aegis of the Queensland Evangelisation Society he entered the missionary field to shearers, miners and Kanaka cane-cutters; his base of operations being the town of Beaudesert.

From data available the missioner must have worked on a part-time basis while he also studied at the Baptist Union theological college from 1910 until he retired from the institution in August, 1911. Apparently, one assumes Missioner Forbes continued his labours in the Beaudesert region.

While residing in Fiji, Newman and Ellen Sarah Eastes Ruddle became the parents of baby Ruby Loloma who, eventually and on March 1, 1911, became the bride of Arthur Forbes in the Bundaberg Methodist church, Queensland. While at Beaudesert Mrs Forbes bore Edna Loloma on February 29, 1912. In due course Edna had two sisters in Iris Ruve on April 14, 1914 and Gloria Daphne on June 5, 1916.

In August, 1912, Reverend A. E. Forbes, DCM, accepted an invitation to superintend the Churches of Christ pastorate of Albion, Queensland. To do so he transferred membership from the Baptist Union to the Churches of Christ, remaining in such affiliation until his death.

At the welcome social in Albion the new pastor confessed to being "keenly conscious of the responsibility in pioneering a new field".

The Home Mission Report of the Annual Assembly of the Baptist Union of Queensland, June 30, 1912, stated that Forbes had "served at the church in Beaudesert for two years and left in August, 1911".

During this year he was listed as a second year student in the Baptist College; if he did not hold the Beaudesert church from August, 1911 until called to Albion in August, 1912 what and where was his vocation? Mrs Forbes gave birth to their first child at Beaudesert.

After a successful ministry of, say, two years at Beaudesert the family moved to the Belmore church in New South Wales in 1914. While resident in this pastorate, World War I erupted and when Australia aligned herself with the Allied Forces, Forbes offered his services as a military chaplain.

The volunteer was accepted for duty and received a commission as Chaplain 4th Class on March 1, 1915.

Chafing at a long delay in being posted for overseas service with the Australian Imperial Force Forbes forfeited the commission and on April 19, 1917, enlisted as Gunner N72252 in the Medium Trench Mortar Battery.

Following some months of training programmes at Duntroon and Liverpool Army Camps Forbes repidly attained the non-commisssioned rank of Sergeant.

On the eve of embarkation with the Battery he was again attested as a Chaplain 4th Class (C of C) on July 30, 1917, for service with the AIF abroad.

Thereon the chaplain was discharged from the Battery on July 31, 1917.

He sailed for England on August 8, 1917, and disembarked at Liverpool, England on October 3, 1917.

His postings in England and France were at various Australian Army Camps and Depots until the return to Australia about May, 1919. The Chaplain received another honourable discharge from the Army on June 10, 1919.

Some estimation of the worth of the Chaplain to the troops at large was given by a Lieutenant L.J. Price who, writing from England, stated "...he is having a great time. The fellows leave other services and come to his. Forbes gives them the stuff they like — bedrock principles and not orthodoxy. He is not afraid to speak to the men either".

Tributes to the work and value of Padre Forbes also came from officers of the Australian Red Cross, the YMCA and Australian Comfort Funds.

For duty in the Great War Chaplain A.E. Forbes, DCM also gained the British War Medal and the Victory Medal.

During the absence of her husband on military postings in this war, Mrs Forbes and family lived at Fairymead, Queensland.

They rejoined Forbes on his return and appointment to the parish at Auburn, New South Wales, in July, 1919.

While stationed at Auburn Forbes recommenced chaplaincy duties in the Citizen Military Forces on a part-time basis on December 19, 1919. He received promotion to Chaplain 1st Class (Temp) and the office of Senior Chaplain (OPD), 2nd Military District. Both positions were relinquished on February 8, 1922, with reversion to Chaplain 4th Class.

Called by the Croydon Church in January, 1923, the Forbes family came to South Australia. After three years of highly commendable effort at Croydon and the Churches of Christ in general, Mr Forbes was appointed to the role of the Church's Evangelist until 1927.

Holding fast to his military interests, Chaplain Forbes maintained contact and service with the 4th Military District. Though named on the Unattached List of Officers for sometime, he received a lift in grading to that of Chaplain 3rd Class on March 1, 1925,and did terms of duty at various training centres.

Accepting the pastorate at Brighton, Victoria, late in 1927, he ministered there until 1930.

The following four years were spent in the world of commerce when he again resumed the Brighton Church from 1935 to 1940. Recall to the Brighton cause indicated with what esteem the minister was held by his people.

Forbes' transference from the 4th to the 3rd Military District, Victoria, took place on 1st November 1929. With the required lapse of five years since elevation to Chaplain 3rd Class, he rose to that of 2nd Class on 1st March, 1930. Yet a further honour was to be awarded Chaplain A.E. Forbes, DCM, when he was awarded the Efficiency Decoration on March 31, 1938.

Forbes returned to South Australia in January, 1940, to hold the pastorate at Mile End for about 18 months. On September 6, 1941, Forbes took office as a full-time duty chaplain in the 4th Military District.

Central Army Records Office, Melbourne, stated that Forbes, on the then Unattached List of Officers, attended as Duty Chaplain to the 2nd



Infantry Training Battalion at Warradale and Wayville from September 17 to November 24, 1940, and to the 48th Battalion from December 27, 1940 to March 3, 1941. After a consistently active and highly commendable military service that spanned the lives of five British sovereigns, Chaplain A.E. Forbes, DCM ED was placed on the Retired List of Officers in Victoria on January 16, 1944.

Mrs E.L. Charlesworth has written that she possesses "Certificate No 36224 certifying that V18998 Chaplain A.E. Forbes (DCM ED), Australian Army Chaplains Department, served Continuous Full-time War Service in the Citizen Military Forces from September 6 1941 to January 15, 1944, which included 642 in Australia for active service.."

On retirement from chaplaincy obligations in 1944, Reverend Mr. Forbes went to the church at Hamilton, Victoria, where he laboured devoutly and to the delight of the congregation, the Church in general civic leaders and the townsfolk as his interests ranged far beyond ecclesiastical fields. Most unfortunately, after one year in Hamilton he was the victim of a coronary occlusion and nephritis that resulted in months of hospitalisation and convalescence.

Evidence became obvious that the "active" ministry of the reverend brother had come to a close. Mr and Mrs Forbes moved from Hamilton to 3 Spring Street, Sandringham, Victoria, to be near their daughters. However, the months of suffering had their ending. Forbes died on Good Friday, April 19, 1946. The late and ex-Pastor and Padre Arthur Edward Forbes, DCM, ED was interred in the New Cheltenham Cemetery, Victoria.

A memorial service for Rev Mr Forbes was held in the Brighton Churches of Christ on Sunday April 28, 1946. At the service were present many representatives of other denominations, civic bodies and many organisations.

Warfare in Shang China

by W. PALMER

THE subject of ancient China generally conjures up in the mind of the layman, little more than a Ming vase, and that bronze horse from the 'Chinese Exhibition' posters.

Of course, it is much more than that. The civilization of ancient China ran uninterrupted for no less than 3,500 years.

More than twice that of our western civilization. It reached an extraordinary level of advancement, both social and technological, far outstripping any other people of the time. It reached a comparative level to that of Rome and Greece.

During this time there were 20 verifiable dynasties, all of which placed no little emphasis on the value of the army.

The first of these, the Shang dynasty, had a complex fighting force, using relatively advanced weapons, and organisation.

Generally, in relation to later dynasties, the Shang were less sophisticated, but nonetheless had significant attributes.

They had a complex social system, with nobles and priests at the top, artisans in the middle, and peasants and slaves below.

They were urbanised, living in substantial dwellings, in cities and towns.

They employed an astrologically based calendar, and a system of writing.

They relied heavily on commerce, and had agrarian and manufacturing industries.

At this time the Egyptians, Greeks, and Olmecs were taking their first steps. The Romans were non existent, and Europe was barely in the stone age.

The Shang rulers were autocrats, and as such maintained even a peace-time army.

This army was the king's private guard.

During times of war, the numbers of troops swelled multifold. By a system of conscription an army of 30,000 could be raised.

Both the King's guard, and the conscripted troops were both well equipped and well organised.

Shang Equipment

Each individual soldier was extremely well equipped. He carried all of the following:

The Bow. Three types of bows were employed, being the Pellet bow, the Compound bow, and the Reflex bow. Of these, only the latter was used to any great extent.

This was their primary weapon. It was of simple design, but nonetheless very effective. Very powerful, it employed a 160-pound pull, many times that of today's sporting bows.

It was made of common wood, by special carpenters, and had cast bronze, and carved jade fittings. The arrows fired were also wood, with feather flights, and bronze arrow head, cast in their thousands in one of the numerous huge bronze foundries.

The arrows were carried in a leather belt at the waist.

Next most important was the Dagger-axe, called "Ko". This was a broad, blunt, instrument. Again, cast in bronze, it was made in large numbers.

It was used for slashing, chopping, and sometimes stabbing.

Again it was carried in the waist belt.

Next was the knife. Like the "Ko" it was of cast bronze. It could be used in hand to hand combat, for stabbing, and for cutting.

The well-dressed soldier of the Shang carried all these weapons.

Additional to this was the shield.

Bronze, and decorated with "fierce animal motifs", it supplemented the armour worn.

This consisted of a hide cuirass, bands or squares of hide in a skirt, and a helmet of hide, with a skull cap, and back and side flaps.

This applied to other ranks, while the officers had the same design, but in bronze.

They had a leather belt at the waist, which carried their arrows, dagger-axe and knife.

It also carried a leather pouch, with a whetstone for sharpening weapons, and rations in the form of rie biscuits and strips of dried meat or fish.

Aside from personal equipment, by far the most important piece of equipment was their ubiquitous chariot.

It was of very simple design, almost the archtypal chariot.

Two wooden spoked wheels, with a team of two or sometimes four horses, semi-circular in shape, it was open at the back, and it carried three men, a charioteer, and two warriors.

The chariots themselves had carved decorations on the wooden body of the chariot and jade and cast bronze fittings.

All troops and military equipment in each division belonged to the lord of the state from which it came, and the equipment was made in the state by the lord's personal craftsmen.

Every Shang city and large town had large bronze foundries, carpenters shops and stitching and carving groups.

All these were the property of the lord of the state and when called upon to send a contingent to the King's army he would have these workshops equip his troops.

In the bronze foundries two types of casting were employed.

Complex valve casting, and single valve casting.

The former was for such items as wine vessels, and the suchlike, and the only military items made this way were officers' helmets.

The single valve system used to cast arrow heads, dagger-axes, knives and so forth, in large batches.

Military Organisation

At all times throughout the Shang dynasty a King's personal guard was maintained.

This consisted of two divisions.

However, when a military expedition was being arranged, the King would send to the lord of some states for several divisions to swell the army.

This was achieved by conscription. At times the army grew to in excess of 30,000 troops.

The army as a whole was divided into contingents of several divisions.

Each division was comprised of three units — an infantry company, an infantry battalion, and a chariot echelon.

The company consisted of one lieutenant, four sergeants and twenty men.

The battalion, the main body of troops, had a captain, four lieutenants, twenty sergeants and one hundred men.

The chariot echelon had twenty five, or five chariots depending on whether it was a large or a small division. Each chariot carried three men.

In addition to this each division had an overall commander — a general.

This made a sum total of 226 men in a large division, and 166 men in a small division. This organisation was simple, but efficient.

Letters to the Editor

SIR,

In the March-June issue of "Sabretache" — Vol XX, No. 2 — there was a brief article from the Army Office Ceremonial Section regarding the release of information from Central Army Records Office to medal collectors.

I wrote to CARO seeking clarification of what they considered a "bona fide" collector to be, and received the following letter from the officer in charge.

This clearly states the information which they will provide to a medal collector.

The problem that arises for most collectors is establishing if the recipient of the medals in the collectors possession is still alive — presuming the medals are not purchased from the original owner but through a dealer or another collector.

While I totally agree with the Army that It is their duty to protect confidential information about Service personnel, I feel that terms "a" to "g" below, contain nothing that would appear to me to be of great confidentiality.

I would appreciate hearing from other Society members, who are medal collectors, with a view to having a submission made to the Army to allow collectors access to the information contained in that paragraph even if the collector cannot advise if the recipient is alive or dead.

Perhaps the 1980 Society Seminar will be a good time for collectors to get together and discuss this matter.

I am hopeful that we may be able to convince the appropriate authorities of the genuine interest of the medal collector in the "man behind the medal," and thereby record more details of our country's military history.

Mike Downey,
5 Boambillee Ave.,
Vaucluse, N.S.W. 2030.

I have outlined below this Office's current policy in regard to the release of information to medal collectors. I have no objection to publication. Although our policy may appear to collectors to be somewhat restrictive, I am sure you will

appreciate that the Army has an inalienable moral duty to protect the confidentiality of the records of service of its ex-members.

Details of service of an ex-member whose medals are in the possession of a collector, whether registered or not, will be released on the production of the written authorisation of the ex-member.

In the case of a deceased ex-member, the following information will normally be given to a collector, again whether registered or not and irrespective of when the ex-member served.

a. Rank at time of award.
b. Date of enlistment.
c. Unit(s).
d. Areas of overseas service.
e. Decorations and awards
f. Date of discharge.
g. Copy of Citation. (if available).

As far as this Office is concerned it is assumed that the ex-member is still living if there is no proof of death.

If CARO has no record of death then the collector will be so advised, furnished with the full name of the ex-member and requested to provide proof of death. Such proof should normally take the form of an Extract of Death. A statement by the collector that he believes the ex-member to be deceased will not be accepted as evidence of death.

The release of the abovementioned information in respect of a deceased ex-member is subject to the discretion of the Officer responsible for releasing such information.

All information is released pursuant to Australian Military Regulation (AMR) 770 (1) (d). This regulation provides for Officers holding certain appointments to release information from personnel records. The regulation also protects those Officers from legal action arising from ommissions and errors contained in the information released.

Yours faithfully,

N. P. Uniacke, Major,
Authorising Officer for Officer in Charge,
Central Army Records Office,
366 St. Kilda Road, Melbourne.

Sir,

In "Sabretache", Oct-Dec, 1979 (page 39), in reply to a query on the first use of barbed wire and defensive grenades, it is implied that barbed wire was first used as a protection for camps during the Cuban War of 1898.

Wire entaglements were used to protect the British camp at Eshowe in 1879 during the Zulu war.

Unfortunately, it is not specified if "barbed" wire was used, but it seems likely.

Wire entanglements were also used around the British garrisoned towns in the Transvaal beseiged by the Boers in 1880-81. Mention is also made of grenades being used in sorties by the defenders.

J. R. Williams,
Stourbridge,
England.

Badge Identification — Part 2

by G.R. VAZENRY

Infantry Unit Numerical Titles

Many of the badges of the Infantry can be identified from the numerical titles shown thereon, when compared with the territorial title and motto. However, since the introduction of the State Regiment system in 1960, this no longer applies as we now have only six regimental badges in the Citizen Forces, plus the RAR, the SASR and Commando units, each of which is distinctive.

Any other Infantry unit not affiliated with one of the aforementioned wears the badge of the RA Inf. Identification of battalions is now possible only from the lanyard worn on the shoulder. (What will happen in war time where we have a sudden expansion of battalions is for the expert to decide — how many colours can be found for lanyards?)

The Royal Australian Regiment

With the unconditional surrender of Japan in August 1945, the Commonwealth Government agreed to participate in the occupation of Japan and raised the 34th Australian Infantry Brigade as Australia's contribution to the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. The Brigade comprised:

a. 65th Infantry Battalion, raised on 12th October 1945, principally from units of the 7th Australian Division, located in Morotai.
b. 66th Infantry Battalion, raised on 16th October 1945 principally from units of 9th Australian Division, located in Labuan.
c. 67th Infantry Battalion, raised on 20th October 1945, from units of the 5th, 6th, 7th and 11th Australian Divisions, located in New Guinea, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and New Britain.

Restoration of General Service Wagon

● A horse drawn wagon used during the 1914-1918 War, which was donated by Mr C. Marshall, has been extensively restored and repainted by the Army Office's workshops at Singleton, New South Wales. This work was undertaken part-time by Army personnel during the past couple of years. The restored wagon was delivered recently to the Mitchell Annex.

Restoration of Mosquito Aircraft

● Considerable progress has been made in the restoration of the D.H. Mosquito aircraft for the War Memorial's collection by employees of Hawker de Havilland, Australia Pty. Ltd. Following the location of a number of essential components in Western Australia, the aircraft will now be able to be restored to its original operational appearance.

On 23rd November, 1948, the battalions were re-designated as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Australian Regiments:

a. 65th Infantry Battalion — 1st Battalion, The Australian Regiment (1 RAR).
b. 66th Infantry Battalion — 2nd Battalion, The Australian Regiment (2 RAR).
c. 67th Infantry Battalion — 3rd Battalion, The Australian Regiment (3 RAR).

On the 10th March, 1949, it was announced that "His Majesty The King has been graciously pleased to give his approval to the prefix 'Royal' being appended to the title of The Australian Regiment."

Due to the expansion of the Australian Army, the Regiment was increased as follows:

4 RAR — was first raised as the RAR Depot on 18 January, 1952, was redesignated as 4 RAR on 10 March, 1952, and again became the Depot Company, RAR, on 24 March. 1960. 4 RAR was raised anew on 1 February, 1964.
5 RAR — raised on 1st March, 1965.
6 RAR — raised on 6th June, 1965.
7 RAR — raised on 1st September, 1965.
8 RAR — raised on 8th August, 1966.
9 RAR — raised on 13th November, 1967.

With the cessation of National Service, and the campaign in Vietnam, the RAR was reorganised by disbanding 4, 7 and 9 Battalions, linking their titles with those of 2, 5 and 8 Battalions.

The Regiment now consists of: 1 RAR; 2/4 RAR from 12 Aug 73; 3 RAR; 5/7 RAR from 14 Dec 73; 6 RAR; 8/9 RAR from 31 Oct 73.

In addition to the Battalions, an independent unit was raised in support of the Jungle Training Centre (JTC) now the Land Warfare Centre, as follows:

JTC Demonstration Pl became
1 Div HQ Defence Coy became 30 Jun 68
10 Independent Rifle Coy 30 Jun 71
Disbanded 10 Mar 73
10 Independent Rifle Coy
RAR re-raised 21 Jun 74

The Special Air Service Regiment (SASR)

1 SAS Coy was raised in 1957, becoming 1 SAS Coy RAR in 1960. In Oct 1964, it separated from the RAR and became 1 SASR. Each of the sabre squadrons have served in Vietnam.

OBITUARY

● **IT IS with regret that we advise the death of Major S. Appleby on Saturday, February 2, after a short illness in Greenslopes Hospital, Brisbane. Major Appleby was a member of the Society for many years and his interest will be missed.**

1903 to 1912	1912
2nd Inf	1st Inf
Kennedy Regt	2nd Inf
Port Curtis Regt	3rd Inf
Wide Bay Regt	4th Inf
7th Inf	5th Inf
8th Inf	6th Inf
9 AIR (%)	7th Inf
Oxley Regt	
9 AIR (%)	8th Inf
New unit	9th Inf
11th Inf	10th Inf
New Unit	11th Inf
9th Inf	12th Inf
14th Inf	13th Inf
4 AIR (%)	14th Inf
16th Inf	15th Inf
NSW Scot Regt	
Aust Rifle Regt	16th Inf
4 AIR (%)	
18th Inf	17th Inf
St George Eng Rifle Regt	
1 AIR (%)	18th Inf
3 AIR (%)	
Aust Rifle Regt	
18th Inf	19th Inf
	20th Inf
1 AIR (%)	21st Inf
21st Inf	22nd Inf
24th Inf	23rd Inf
2 AIR (%)	24th Inf
NSW Scot Regt	25th Inf
25th Inf	26th Inf
	27th Inf
	28th
Aust Rifle Regt	29th Inf
29th Inf	30th Inf
St Georges Eng rifle Regt	31st Inf
1 AIR (%)	
31st Inf	32nd Inf
NSW Irish Rifles	33rd Inf
33rd Inf	34th Inf
	35th Inf
	36th Inf
39th Inf	37th Inf
	38th Inf
St Georges Eng	
2 AIR (%) - 1 AIR (%)	39th Inf
39th Inf	40th Inf
3 AIR (%)	41st Inf
41st Inf	42nd Inf
2 AIR (%)	43rd Inf
43rd Inf	44th Inf

1903 to 1912	
46th Inf (%)	45th Inf
Vic Rangers (%)	46th Inf
46th Inf (%)	47th Inf
	48th Inf
6 AIR (%)	49th Inf
49th Inf	50th Inf
Vic Rifles	51st Inf
5 AIR (%)	
Vic Scot Regt	52nd Inf
56th Inf	53rd Inf
	54th Inf
	55th Inf
6 AIR (%)	56th Inf
60th Inf	57th Inf
	58th Inf
	59th Inf
5 AIR (%)	60th Inf
64th Inf	61st Inf
63rd Inf	62nd Inf
6 AIR (%)	63rd Inf
5 AIR (%)	64th Inf
66th Inf	65th Inf
1 Bn 8 AIR	66th Inf
2 Bn 8 AIR	
Vic Rangers (%)	67th Inf
67th Inf	68th Inf
70th Inf	69th Inf
7 AIR	70th Inf
	71st Inf
71st Inf	72nd Inf
Vic Rangers (%)	73rd Inf
S Aust Inf (%)	74th Inf
78th Inf	75th Inf
S Aust Inf (%)	
2 coys of inf	76th Inf
10 AIR (%)	
76th Inf	77th Inf
10 AIR (%)	78th Inf
	79th
79th Inf	80th Inf
S Aust Inf (%)	81st Inf
81st Inf	82nd Inf
area not used	
Goldfields Inf	84th Inf
84th Inf	85th Inf
W Aust Inf (%)	
11 AIR (%)	86th Inf
86th Inf	87th Inf
W Aust Inf (%)	
11 AIR (%)	88th Inf
88th Inf	89th Inf
91st Inf	90th Inf
Tas Rangers	91st Inf
12 AIR	92nd Inf
Derwent Regt	93rd Inf

1903	1912	
1 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
4 coys	21 Inf	
2 coys	18 Inf	(y)
1 coy	31 Inf	
1 coy	39 Inf	(y)
2 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
4 coys	24 Inf	
1 coy	39 Inf	(y)
3 coys	43 Inf	
3 AIR — HQ & 7 Coys	41 Inf	
MGs & 1 coy	18 Inf	(y)
4 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
3 coys	16 Inf	
5 coys	14 Inf	
5 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
4 coys	64 Inf	
2 coys	60 Inf	
2 coys	51 Inf	(x)
6 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
4 coys	63 Inf	
2 coys	49 Inf	(x)
2 coys	56 Inf	
7 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
4 coys	70 Inf	
4 coys	71 Inf	
8 AIR — 1 Bn	66 Inf	
2 Bn	67 Inf	
9 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
6 coys	7 Inf	
2 coys	8 Inf	
10 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
4 coys	78 Inf	
1 coy	76 Inf	(x)
3 coys	79 Inf	(x)
11 AIR — HQ, MGs &		
5 coys	88 Inf	(y)
3 coys	86 Inf	
12 AIR - 11	92 Inf	(y)
Vic Rangers — HQ,		
MGs, 4½ coys	73 Inf	(x)
2½ coys	67 Inf	
1 coy	46 Inf	
Vic Rifles	51 Inf	(x)
Vic Scottish	52 Inf	

1903	1912	
NSW Scot — HQ, MGs &		
7 coys	25 Inf	(y)
1 coy	16 Inf	
Aust Rifles — HQ, MGs &		
6 coys	29 Inf	
1 coy	16 Inf	
1 coy	18 Inf	(y)
NSW Irish Rifle Regt	33 Inf	
St Georges Eng — HQ		
MGs & 3 coys	31 Inf	
2 coys	18 Inf	(y)
3 coys	39 Inf	(y)
Wide Bay Inf Regt	4 Inf	
Oxley Regt	8 Inf	
Port Curtis Inf	3 Inf	(x)
Kennedy Regt	2 Inf	
S Aust Inf — HQ	76 Inf	(x)
MGs, Band, 4 coys	81 Inf	
4 coys	74 Inf	(x)
2 coys att 10 AIR	76 Inf	(x)
Goldfields Inf Regt	84 Inf	
W Aust Inf — HQ, 3 coy	86 Inf	
3 coys	88 Inf	(y)
Derwent Regt	93 Inf	
Tas Rangers	91 Inf	
New units in Qld	9 Inf	(x)
	11 Inf	(x)

(x) Units consisted of HQ and 4 coys

(y) Unit consisted of HQ, MG Sect & 8 coys.

Remaining units had a HQ, MG Sect and 6 coys

A total of 43 battalions were formed from existing units, in 1912. Between then and 1918 further units were raised from the original 43. This was done by, in 1912, dividing the country into 93 battalion areas, the 43 raised battalions covering as many as 4 areas each. In addition, the Sydney University Scouts and Melbourne University Rifles were also in existence.

Changes in Unit Designations

Formed 1918	From Inf Regt
2/1	24, 25, 26, 28
2/2	14, 16
2/3	39, 43
2/4	25, 27, 28
2/5	51, 52, 81
2/6	64
2/7	66
2/8	70
2/9	7
2/10	78
2/11	88
2/12	91
2/13	16
2/14	49
2/15	8
2/16	86
2/17	17
2/18	19
2/19	22
2/20	20
2/21	73
2/22	56
2/23	69
2/24	48
2/25	11
2/26	9
2/27	74
2/28	85
2/29	55
2/30	30
2/31	2
2/32	79
2/33	13, 14
2/34	37
2/35	13
2/36	29, 31
2/37	47
2/38	57
2/39	71
2/40	93
2/41	12
2/42	3
2/43	76
2/44	89
2/45	38, 39
2/46	46
2/47	4
2/48	60
2/49	18
2/50	81
2/51	87
2/52	5
2/53	35
2/54	42
2/55	33, 34
2/56	44
2/57	57
2/58	58
2/59	63
2/60	60
5/1	21,22
5/2	15
5/3	42, 43, 44
5/4	33, 36
5/5	62
5/6	61
5/7	68
5/8	65
5/9	6
5/10	77
5/12	90
5/13	14
5/14	50
5/17	18
5/18	39, 40
5/19	23
5/20	41, 42
5/21	59
5/22	53
5/23	72
5/24	47
5/27	75
5/29	54
5/30	32
5/40	92
5/45	38
5/53	36, 39
5/58	58
5/59	59
2/1 Pnr	14
2/2 Pnr	84
2/3 Pnr	45
2/4 Pnr	10
2/5 Pnr	82

1912-18		Became in 1918	
1 Inf		2/49 Inf	(Queensland)
2 Inf		2/31 Inf	
3 Inf		2/42 Inf	
4 Inf		2/47 Inf	
5 Inf		2/52 Inf	
6 Inf		5/9 Inf	
7 Inf		2/9 Inf	
8 Inf		2/15 Inf	
9 Inf		2/26 Inf	
10 Inf		2/4 Pnr	
11 Inf		2/25 Inf	
12 Inf		2/41 Inf	
13 Inf		2/35 and 2/33 Inf	(New South Wales)
14 Inf		2/1 Pnr, 5/13, 2/2 and 2/33 Inf	
15 Inf	(a)	5/2 Inf	
16 Inf		2/2 and 2/13 Inf	
17 Inf		2/17 Inf	
18 Inf		5/17 Inf	
19 Inf		2/18 Inf	
20 Inf		2/20 Inf	
21 Inf		5/1 Inf	
22 Inf	(a)	5/1 and 2/19 Inf	
23 Inf		5/19 Inf	
24 Inf		2/1 Inf	
25 Inf		2/4 and 2/1 Inf	
26 Inf		2/1 Inf	
27 Inf		2/4 Inf	
28 Inf		2/1 and 2/4 Inf	
29 Inf		2/36 Inf	
30 Inf		2/30 Inf	
31 Inf		2/36 Inf	
32 Inf		5/30 Inf	
33 Inf		5/4 and 2/55 Inf	
34 Inf		2/55 Inf	
35 Inf	(a)	2/53 Inf	
36 Inf	(a)	5/4 and 5/53 Inf	
37 Inf		2/34 Inf	
38 Inf		5/45 and 2/45 Inf	
39 Inf		2/3, 2/45, 5/18 and 5/53 Inf	
40 Inf	(a)	5/18 Inf	
41 Inf		5/20 Inf	
42 Inf		5/3, 5/20, 2/54,	
43 Inf		2/3 and 5/3 Inf	
44 Inf		5/3 and 2/56 Inf	
45 Inf		2/3 Pnr	(Victoria)
46 Inf		2/46 Inf	
47 Inf	(a)	2/37 and 5/24 Inf	
48 Inf		2/24 Inf	
49 Inf		2/14 Inf	
50 Inf	(a)	5/14 Inf	

1912-18		Formed 1918	
51 Inf		2/5 Inf	(Victoria)
52 Inf		2/5 Inf	
53 Inf	(a)	5/22 Inf	
54 Inf	(a)	5/29 Inf	
55 Inf		2/29 Inf	
56 Inf		2/22 Inf	
57 Inf	(a)	2/57 Inf	
58 Inf		2/58 and 5/58 Inf	
59 Inf	(a)	5/21 and 5/59 Inf	
60 Inf		2/60 Inf	
61 Inf		5/6 Inf	
62 Inf	(a)	5/5 Inf	
63 Inf		2/59 Inf	
64 Inf		2/6 Inf	
65 Inf	(a)	5/8 Inf	
66 Inf		2/7 Inf	
67 Inf		2/38 Inf	
68 Inf		5/7 Inf	
69 Inf	(a)	2/23 Inf	
70 Inf		2/8 Inf	
71 Inf		2/39 Inf	
72 Inf	(a)	5/23 Inf	
73 Inf		2/21 Inf	
74 Inf		2/27 Inf	(South Australia)
75 Inf		5/27 Inf	
76 Inf		2/43 Inf	
77 Inf	(a)	5/10 Inf	
78 Inf		2/10 Inf	
79 Inf		2/32 Inf	
80 Inf	(a)	2/48 Inf	
81 Inf		2/50 Inf	
82 Inf		2/5 Pnr	
83 Inf		Number not used	(Western Australia)
84 Inf		2/2 Pnr	
85 Inf		2/28 Inf	
86 Inf		2/16 Inf	
87 Inf		2/51 Inf	
88 Inf		2/11 Inf	
89 Inf		2/44 Inf	
90 Inf		5/12 Inf	(Tasmania)
91 Inf		2/12 Inf	
92 Inf		5/40 Inf	
93 Inf		2/40 Inf	

NOTE: (a) raised by MO 405/1915

1918/21	Became 1921
2/1 Inf	1, 19, 35, 55 Bns
2/2 Inf	2 Bn
2/3 Inf	3 & 53 Bns
2/4 Inf	30 & 55 Bns
2/5 Inf	5 Bn
2/6 Inf	6 Bn
2/7 Inf	7 Bn
2/8 Inf	8 Bn
2/9 Inf	49 Bn
2/10 Inf	10 Bn
2/11 Inf	11 & 28 Bns
2/12 Inf	12 Bn
2/13 Inf	2 Bn
2/14 Inf	14 Bn
2/15 Inf	15 Bn
2/16 Inf	28 & 44 Bns
2/17 Inf	17 Bn
2/18 Inf	18 Bn
2/19 Inf	3 & 20 Bns
2/20 Inf	3 & 20 Bns
2/21 Inf	7 & 21 Bns
2/22 Inf	13 & 22 Bns
2/23 Inf	23 & 32 Bns
2/24 Inf	24 & 39 Bns
2/25 Inf	25 Bn, AFA, AAMC
2/26 Inf	26 Bn
2/27 Inf	27 Bn
2/28 Inf	28 & 44 Bns
2/29 Inf	22, 29 & 60 Bns
2/30 Inf	30 Bn
2/31 Inf	31 Bn
2/32 Inf	10 Bn
2/33 Inf	33 Bn
2/34 Inf	34 Bn
2/35 Inf	33 Bn
2/36 Inf	36 & 55 Bns
2/37 Inf	37 Bn
2/38 Inf	38 Bn
2/39 Inf	8 Bn
2/40 Inf	40 Bn
2/41 Inf	41 Bn
2/42 Inf	42 Bn, 11 Fd Amb
2/43 Inf	43 Bn
2/44 Inf	Never raised
2/45 Inf	45 & 53 Bns
2/46 Inf	5, 6, 37, 46 Bns
2/47 Inf	47 Bn
2/48 Inf	10 & 43 Bn
2/49 Inf	31 Bn
2/50 Inf	10, 43, 50 Bns
2/51 Inf	11, 44 Bns, AE, AASC/
2/52 Inf	9 Bn, 2 LH /AAMC
2/53 Inf	53 Bn

1918/21	Became 1921
2/54 Inf	54 Bn
2/55	55 Bn
2/56 Inf	56 Bn
2/57 Inf	57 Bn
2/58 Inf	58 Bn
2/59 Inf	59 Bn
2/60 Inf	5, 6, 59 Bns
5/1 Inf	1 Bn
5/2 Inf	2 & 35 Bns
5/3 Inf	3 & 56 Bns
5/4 Inf	36 & 55 Bns
5/5 Inf	6 Bn
5/6 Inf	22 & 29 Bns
5/7 Inf	38 Bn
5/8 Inf	32 Bn
5/9 Inf	9 & 49 Bns, 2 IH, AFA, AE, AASC
5/10 Inf	43 Bn
5/12 Inf	52 Bn
5/13 Inf	13 Bn
5/14 Inf	14 & 46 Bns
5/15 Inf	29 Bn
5/17 Inf	17 & 18 Bns
5/18 Inf	4 Bn
5/19 Inf	19 Bn
5/20 Inf	20 & 54 Bns
5/21 Inf	6 & 58 Bns
5/22 Inf	39 Bn
5/23 Inf	21 & 23 Bns
5/24 Inf	37 & 48 Bns
5/27 Inf	27 Bn
5/29 Inf	60 Bn
5/30 Inf	4 & 30 Bns
5/40 Inf	51 Bn
5/45 Inf	45 Bn
5/53 Inf	36 Bn
5/58 Inf	58 Bn
5/59 Inf	59 Bn
2/1 Pnr	No trace found
2/2 Pnr	16 Bn
2/3 Pnr	48 Bn
2/4 Pnr	25 Bn, AFA
2/5 Pnr	50 Bn
7 Fd Amb	31 Bn
16 Fd Amb	25 & 41 Bns
19 Fd Amb	3 Bn
7 San Sec	25 Bn
23 Fd Amb	16 Bn
21 Coy ASC	31 Bn
19 LH	21 Bn
27 LH	31 Bn
29 LH	5, 6, 14, 22, 32, 23, 24, 29, 37, 39, 46 58, 59, 60 Bns

1921/45	Raised from 1921
1 Bn	2/1, 5/1 Bn
2 Bn	2/2, 2/13, 5/2 Bns
3 Bn	2/2, 2/20, 5/3 Bns, 19 Fd Amb
4 Bn	5/18, 5/30 Bns
5 Bn	2/5, 2/46, 2/60 Bns 29 LH
6 Bn	2/6, 2/46, 2/60, 5/5, 5/21 Bns, 29 LH
7 Bn	2/7, 2/21 Bns
8 Bn	2/8, 2/39 Bns, 6 Fd Amb
9 Bn	2/52, 5/9 Bns
10 Bn	2/10, 2/32, 2/48 & 2/50 Bns
11 Bn	2/11, 2/51 Bns
12 Bn	2/12 Bn
13 Bn	2/22, 5/18 Bns
14 Bn	2/14, 5/14 Bns, 29 LH
15 Bn	2/15 Bn
16 Bn	23 Fd Amb, 2/2 Pnr
17 Bn	2/17, 5/17 Bns
18 Bn	2/18, 5/17 Bns
19 Bn	2/1, 2/19, 5/19 Bns
20 Bn	2/20, 5/20 Bns
21 Bn	2/21, 5/23 Bns, 19 LH
22 Bn	2/22, 2/29, 5/6 Bns 29 LH
23 Bn	2/23, 5/23 Bns, 29 LH
24 Bn	2/24, 29 LH
25 Bn	2/25 Bn, 16 Fd Amb 7 San Sec, 2/4 Pnr
26 Bn	2/26 Bn
27 Bn	2/27 & 5/27 Bns
28 bn	2/11, 2/28, 2/16 Bns
29 Bn	2/29, 5/6, 5/15 Bns, 29 LH
30 Bn	2/4, 2/30, 5/30 Bns
31 Bn	2/31, 2/49 Bns, 27 LH, 21 Coy ACS, 7 Fd Amb
32 Bn	2/23, 5/8 Bns, 29 LH
33 Bn	2/33, 2/35 Bns
34 Bn	2/34 Bn
35 Bn	2/1, 5/2 Bns
36 Bn	2/36, 5/4, 5/52 Bns
37 Bn	2/37, 2/46, 5/24 Bns, 29 LH
38 Bn	2/38, 5/7 Bns
39 Bn	2/24, 5/22 Bns 29 LH
40 Bn	2/40 Bn
41 Bn	2/41 Bn, 16 Fd Amb
42 Bn	2/42 Bn
43 Bn	2/43, 2/48, 2/50 & 5/10 Bns
44 Bn	2/16, 2/28, 2/51 Bns
45 Bn	2/45 & 5/45 Bns
46 Bn	2/46, 5/14 Bns, 29 LH
47 Bn	2/47 Bn
48 Bn	5/24 Bn, 2/3 Pnr
49 Bn	2/9, 5/9 Bns
50 Bn	2/50 Bn, 2/5 Pnr
51 Bn	5/40 Bn
52 Bn	5/12 Bn
58 Bn	2/3, 2/45, 2/53 Bns
54 Bn	2/54, 5/20 Bns
55 Bn	2/1, 2/4, 2/36, 2/55, 5/4 Bns
56 Bn	2/56, 5/3 Bns
57 Bn	2/57 Bn
58 Bn	2/58, 5/21, 5/58 Bns, 29 LH
59 Bn	2/59, 2/60, 5/59 Bns, 29 LH
60 Bn	2/29, 5/29 Bns 29 LH
61 Bn	Raised 1938 Qld
62 Bn	Raised 1942 from 14 Garrison Bn

Historic Aerial Flight Exhibition

● **In December 1979 the War Memorial contributed photographs and relics to a special display at the National Library of Australia to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Keith and Sir Ross Smith aerial flight to Australia from Britain.**

1948-60	1960		1965
9 Bn	1 RQR —	A (Moreton)	9 RQR
47 Bn		D (Wide Bay) Coy	
		C Coy	25 RQR
25 Bn		B (Darling Downs) Coy	
41 Bn		E (Byron Scottish) Coy	41 RQR
51 Bn	2 RQR —	A (Far N Qld) Coy	51 RQR
31 Bn		B (Far N Qld) Coy det Sp Coy	
		C (Kennedy) Coy	31 RQR
42 Bn		D (Capricornia) Coy E (Capricornia) Coy Sp Coy (less det)	42 RQR
1 Bn	1 RNSWR	(Cdo)	1 RNSWR (Cdo)
6 RNSWR	2 RNSWR —	E (Mounted Rifles) Coy	2 RNSWR
30 Bn		A (NSW Scottish) Coy	
2 Bn		B (North Shore) Coy	
		C (City of Newcastle) Coy	17 RNSWR
13 Bn		D (Macquarie) Coy	
17-18 Bn		Sp (Kuring-Gai) Coy	
45 Bn	3 RNSWR —	Sp (St Georges) Coy A (St Georges) Coy	2 RNSWR
34 Bn		B (Illawarra) Coy	
8 Bn		C (Werriwa) Coy	4 RNSWR
4 Bn		D (Aust Rifles) Coy E (Riverina) Coy	
5 Bn	1 RVR —	Sp & Admin Coys	5 RVR
6 Bn		B (Merri) Coy C (Melbourne) Coy	6 RVR
58/32 Bn		D (Essendon) Coy E (Footscray) Coy A Coy	1 RVR
38 Bn	2 RVR —	C (Sunraysia) Coy	1 Indep Rifle Coy
		D (Bendigo) Coy	2 RVR
8-7 Bn		B (Ballarat) Coy	
59 Bn		E (Goulburn Valley) Coy	
		A (Geelong) Coy	10 Med Regt
10 Bn	1 RSAR —	D (Adelaide) Coy B (River) Coy part Sp Coy	1 then 10 RSAR
27 Bn		part Sp Coy A (South East) Coy C (Middle North) Coy	10 then 27 RSAR
43-48 Bn		E (Port Adelaide) Coy	

11-44 Bn	1 RWAR —	A (City of Perth) Coy	2 RWAR
		B (West Aust Rifles) Coy	1 RWAR
16 Bn		D (Cameron) Coy	
28 Bn		C (Swan) Coy	
		E (North East) Coy	2 RWAR
12 Bn		Launceston Coy	1 RTR
40 Bn		Derwent Coy	

1965			**Present**
49 RQR (1)			49 RQR
9 RQR			9 RQR
25 RQR			25 RQR
51 RQR			51 Indep Rifle Coy
31 RQR			31 Indep Rifle Coy
42 RQR			42 RQR
41 RQR		(1967)	41 RNSWR
1 RNSWR (Cdo)			1 Cdo Coy
19 RNSWR (1)			1/19 RNSWR
2 RNSWR			2 RNSWR
17 RNSWR			17 RNSWR
3 RNSWR			3 RNSWR
4 RNSWR			4 RNSWR
2 Cdo Coy			2 Cdo Coy
5 RVR			
6 RVR		(30 Jun 75)	1 RVR
1 RVR			
1 Indep Rifle Coy			
2 RVR		(30 Jun 75)	2 RVR
22 RVR (1)			
10 RSAR			
27 RSAR		(1 Jan 76)	10 RSAR
43 RSAR			
2 RWAR	11 RWAR	(1 Jan 66)	11 Indep Rifle Coy
1 RWAR	16 RWAR		16 Indep Rifle Coy
28 RWAR			28 Indep Rifle Coy
			12 Indep Rifle Coy
1 RTR		(30 Jun 75)	
			40 Indep Rifle Coy
			7 Indep Rifle Coy (in NT)

NOTE:

(1) 49 RQR, 19 RNSWR, 22 RVR, 43 RSAR and 28 RWAR were raised by AHQ approval of 11 Aug 66 to cater for NS volunteers for the CMF who were unable to join a normal CMF unit. These were the "Bush Rifles" (unofficial).

The Background to South Australia's Defence Policy

by H.J. ZWILLENBERG

This Government realises it had no option but to accept the position that this Colony is thrown entirely on its resources in the event of war.

Chief-Secretary of South Australia, 1870 (1)

What do you think is preferable to say to a Colony which is willing to pay a certain amount towards its defences, that it should contribute in the shape of part payment for Imperial troops or that it should raise a Colonial force of its own.

Question put to Lord Herbert and J.R. Godley by the Mills Committee in 1861 (2)

My main object is to throw upon the Colonists that habit and responsibility of self-defence

J.R. Godley in 1861 (3)

Australians would feel very succinctly the dangers to which they are exposed by virtue of their connection with England and the hardship of being ravaged with fire and sword for the sake of Polish nationality and the redress of balance of power in Europe.

Adelaide Times, 17.9.1864

British Protection or Colonial Self-Reliance

Until the outbreak of the Crimean War, there was a general understanding in South Australia that England was under an obligation to safeguard the external security of the colonies, particularly while they were undergoing a struggle for settlement, for economic progress and for internal stability. No one doubted that the Mother Country would look after her offspring. Besides, the Empire was at peace, and the power of the Empire, that is, the power of Great Britain, was believed to be such that any ideas of challenging it were simply laughable. Enemies just did not exist.

The outward sign of British power, the men-of-war, were in the area but their visits to South Australia were few. Between 1841 and 1854 only two ships called at South Australia's principal port: the 18-gun frigate *Fly* in 1845, and the 22-gun frigate *Phantom* in 1854.

These rare visits had caused no concern, but after the Crimean War some apprehension was expressed that British men-of-war never seemed to be near the Colony, and that the Flag was not shown as much as it might have been (4).

It was felt that "... as long as we remain Britain's dependencies her honour is concerned in preserving our shore" (5).

These were the first rumblings of a movement towards neutrality and perhaps the first doubts regarding Britain's intention, or even ability, to protect South Australia against a foreign attack.

In 1860, the daily press stressed the poor performance of Colonel C.E. Gold and his regular British troops in New Zealand. It was also felt that the Australian colonies were too far away, for Britain to give effective help. By the time Britain learned of an attack it might be too late. The colonies still considered themselves entitled to some help, but "if

Britain was prepared and anxious to abandon her distant children and thus lose her prestige ... that was her affair" (6).

The then Governor of South Australia, Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell, lost no time in advising London of the colonists' apprehensions, but counselled against spending money on Imperial troops and suggested it would be wiser to use the expenditure on "teaching Her Majesty's loyal subjects here to defend the soil themselves, if necessary" (7).

MacDonnell had not always held this view. His ideas on defence had undergone a remarkable metamorphosis since July, 1859 when he suggested that four companies of regulars be stationed in South Australia; although more expensive, they would be a better proposition than volunteers.

One month later he asked for six Armstrong guns and 12 artillery pensioners to train volunteers (8), but later was prepared to make do with only five pensioners (9).

In the course of his correspondence with the Duke of Newcastle the Governor realised that no additional troops, would be forthcoming unless the colony paid heavily for them (10). Aware now of Britain's attitude, MacDonnell went to the other extreme, that of rejecting all Imperial troops.

Britain was insisting on colonial self-reliance. She not only tried to persuade the South Australians; she was forcing them to see the advantages of maintaining their own defence forces. In 1862 the Duke of Newcastle tried to impress on South Australians the necessity of looking after their own defence.

"The alarm★ will not have been wholly useless if it shall have impressed upon the Colonial Governments the necessity of prompt and effectual preparations against contingencies" (11).

The same sentiment was also voiced by the Governor, Sir Dominick Daly, in 1863.

"The public mind should become familiarised with the total absence of Her Majesty's troops ... "(12). Although by 1865, South Australians appeared to be convinced that they would have to rely on themselves for protection, the actual advantages of self-reliance were still being stressed, from time to time, as if it was necessary to convince the colonists of their validity. The press insisted that South Australians were good soldiers, and that it was better to have one's own men than to have to ask, repeatedly, for troops, who seemed almost like foreigners, and who were also very expensive (13).

In the latter part of 1865 a new notion crept into the colonists' heads. While the question of whether or not to rely on its own volunteers was quite settled in principle, it became known that, under certain conditions, British troops were still obtainable. With adolescent petulance, South Australians asked,

why should a policeman in blue do duty before Government House in Adelaide whilst a soldier in red has to perform similar work in the rest of Her Majesty's dependencies ... (and) why has this Colony no share at all in the red cloth and pipeclay so liberally provided? (14)

Here was South Australia, missing out on a free hand-out, and totally unaware, apparently, that the *free* garrisons applied only to posts maintained for Imperial purposes. The truth must have been known to many people in the colony, yet no attempt was made to enlighten the public.

★ The threatened war between the United States of America and Great Britain.

While the debate was generally childish, there were also political, indeed almost radical under-tones. The press took South Australians to task for lacking the true pioneering spirit of the early American colonists (15), who were less concerned with rapid economic progress, (with a view to returning *home* with huge colonial fortunes) but who wished to live and to die in their new lands.

They were, therefore, imbued with a military frontier spirit which enabled them to defend themselves against the Indians and the French. In the Australian colonies people were far too busy making money to waste their time on soldiering and to squander their precious labour force on non-profit ventures. They preferred to leave their protection to providence and the Horse Guards.

Even those who accepted the concept of self-reliance tended to view it from two different sides (16). The radical theorists argued that not having Imperial troops in the Colony, and having to rely on oneself, made the citizens truly free people, through the association of both the burden and the privilege of freedom. The more practical colonists appreciated changes in Empire defence, brought about by improved communications, and realised that, if England concentrated her forces in Europe, they could be all the more expeditiously sent to a trouble spot. If thus speedily dealt with, international conflagrations were less likely to involve the Australian colonies.

The evidence given by Gladstone and Lowe before the Mills Committee largely reflected these two attitudes. Gladstone maintained that scarcity of labour had never been an excuse for lack of self-defence anywhere, and also that the garrison system had done serious harm to the spirit of freedom and self-reliance. The more cynical Lowe thought it "strange that we the English should send people from England to defend the antipodes while we leave the young men of Australia to grow up without the knowledge of arms."

Some of Lowe's remarks appealed to the radical elements in South Australia, particularly his comments on the popularity of large military expenditure in the capital cities, and the money which could be made out of war, provided that it was carried on somewhere else (17).

In 1870 the Imperial troops left, thus effectively settling the question. The Colony had accepted Britain's view that the troops had, after all, been no more than a formal link with the Crown, not an admission of British responsibility for protecting the colonies. It was up to the colonies themselves to resist aggression, and this could only be done by relying on their own strength (18). This realisation compelled south Australians to ask themselves two basic questions: whom do we have to fear and why and what should our relationship with England be. The colonists knew that both these questions had been discussed from the early sixties onwards, and they also knew that the problems were complex and inextricably inter-dependent.

South Australia's Fears of Aggression

Australian colonies occupied a unique position in the history of the British Empire: their security was never threatened. By contrast, the American colonies fought against the Indians or against the French, the Canadians faced aggression from America, New Zealand had its Maori Wars and the settlers at the Cape were confronted with attacks by African tribes.

As prosperity in Australia grew, particularly after the gold rushes, the colonies felt they were now important enough to invite foreign aggression. It was possible, though, that

... the belief that distant powers would consider an Australian colony a desirable prize was really a symptom of the colonies' growing satisfaction with their own situation and the frequent discussion of the best means of withholding an attack from the current enemy was really a form of shadow boxing... (19)

However, in the latter part of the 19th century, Australia's fears of aggression tended to be associated with potential involvement in the wars of Great Britain. This was coupled with an Australian Monroe Doctrine, evident as early as 1827, when the *Sydney Gazette* argued that Australia could not afford to let any foreign power gain a foot-hold near her shores (20). Also colonial rivalries of the great powers could produce "another Europe, a powder keg which may blow up into Australian faces" (21).

Mainland Asia itself played little part in Australia's fears, for it was controlled by Europe. The Chinese were not seen as a military menace, but only as a socially disturbing influence which by the end of the century had become the cause of the White Australia Policy (22).

The Japanese, at first, were seen as a source of potential cheap labour. It was not until the end of the century, after the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, that Japan was considered a potential enemy. From that period onwards some of the New South Wales annual military exercises took the form of repelling fictitious Japanese raids on Sydney Harbour, when A.M. Simpson, South Australian M.H.A., warned of the new warlike power in the East (23).

Most Australians saw the rise of Japan as a chance for a healthy balance of power and an effective barrier against the advance of the "dreaded Muscovite" (24), and many considered that

the drivel about British protection (had) in fact become part of the Australian's very existence, and but for this he would long ago have perceived that his country was already better protected than Britain herself and that, with the single exception of Russia, no State in all Europe was so invulnerable as this continent (25).

The arguments were sound and based not on political conjectures but simply on the physical difficulties involved in equipping a major expeditionary force and sending it half way round the globe to annex Australia. In the days of sail such expeditions were considered possible, but in the days of steam they were out of the question. The Mexican venture of Napoleon III, the defence of Plevna and events in South America were cited as evidence that "1,000 leagues of open sea was a stronger bulwark than 100,000 men and that two oceans were a more reliable rampart than the two largest armies to be found anywhere on this earth" (26). Nevertheless, Australians in turn feared the French, the Americans, the Russians and the Germans.

The French

Animosity to France was traditional. Most of the early settlers either remembered the French wars or had actively participated in them. Early French explorers had shown interest in both Australia and the Pacific, and Napoleon I was said to have instructed his admirals to attack the Australian setttlements as a means of diverting British naval and military power (27).

French influence began to make itself felt with Bougainville in 1766, and was sustained by de Surville, Fresne, La Perouse and Baudin. The latter particularly, aroused suspicions of French intentions in New Holland and elsewhere east of the Cape of Good Hope. As a result, Norfolk Island was settled, followed by expeditions to Van Dieman's Land. In 1826 King George Sound was established to counteract French and American designs in the Pacific, and then Stirling advanced French activities as one of his arguments for a settlement in Western Australia (28). Similarly, fears of French aggression led to attempts to establish an Imperial garrison on the North Coast of Australia (29, 30).

French exploration of the Pacific Islands at the turn of the century was largely scientific, but d'Urville's second voyage, 1837-1840, added political and economic undertones which were duly noted in Australia.

"The French ... were motivated by the spirit of nationalistic competition with the British on one hand and hopes of future economic growth on the other" (31).

Beginning with the reign of Louis Phillippe, France desired to recover her former position as a great Imperial power, and avidly sought new territory in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the South West Pacific. News of the French establishment in Tahiti aroused anger in Australia, and prompted a sort of Pacific Monroe Doctrine, which, although repudiated by Britain, insisted that the Pacific islands were British, either as a protectorate or by sovereignty.

In actual fact, the Australians had no legal authority to do anything about it, Britain had no firm policy on the matter, and the French, Germans and Americans lacked the power to implement their interests and subsequently to sustain them.

South Australians reacted quite sanely to French scares. In 1841 there was a remote risk of war between France and England over some contentious points concerning Egypt and Syria, and France had allegedly begun military preparations on a large scale.

Yet, the daily press in South Australia declared that "immediate war ... was not contemplated, for it would be ridiculous to think of attacking England with twenty sail of line ..." (32).

Similarly, the *Ville de Bordeaux* incident in February, 1841, was not regarded as a potential threat to the safety of the Colony, although 50 years later, Hodder interpreted it as such (33).

What did happen was that the French ship called at Holdfast Bay to buy sheep and other livestock for Bourbon, and aroused the suspicions of the Governor's secretary, who promptly instructed Captain Biron, her master, to hand the vessel over to the harbour authorities, which the latter refused to do. R.R. Torrens, the Collector of Customs, then proceeded to seize the ship. In the meantime, the authorities assumed that the French ship had sailed away and sent the steamer *Courier* after her. The pursuit, later referred to as the "shingle expedition", cost the Government £800 (34).

C.R. Badger's investigation in 1930 clearly showed that no military or naval measures of any kind were warranted (35).

French activities in the Pacific did cause some concern of a non-military nature. Australians had always had a certain proprietary interest in New Caledonia (sandalwood and coconut oil trade) and a suggestion had even been

made, in 1842, for a system of colonisation on the island. Thus, when the French established their sovereignty over New Caledonia, in 1853, Australia's protests were very bitter (36).

However, England was too preoccupied with Russia to heed them, and besides, trade continued to flourish unimpaired.

The 1859 crisis in the Franco-Austrian war was also viewed as a European affair. Britain might not stay neutral, particularly in view of the French naval build-up in the Mediterranean, but, in general, the colonies, and South Australia in particular, were not likely to be affected (37).

More attention was paid to the reported strengthening of French naval forces in New Caledonia, from six men-of-war to nine, and the *Observer* suggested that Britain ought to counter French threats in the Pacific by creating military establishments on islands not yet annexed, in order to forestall a French monopoly in the area (38).

At any rate, Britain's declaration of neutrality, in August 1859, closed the subject for the time being. Consequently, while no-one trusted Napoleon III, or his motives, responsible public opinion suggested, that "we have nothing to fear from France ..." (39).

The idea of a French, or any other foreign threat was even mildly ridiculed. There were suggestions that the ladies should form a corps of archers and become dead shots into the hearts of Frenchmen, and that duck farms should be established to placate invading gourmets (40).

Why then, in contrast to the general public calm, had members of the South Australian legislature become so alarmed? (41)

Perhaps information received from the colonial Secretary, Sir E.B. Lytton, produced this state of mind. The dispatch of 6th May, 1859 (42), expressed the hope that Britain may remain neutral in the conflict. However, the Governor, Sir Richard Graves MacDonnell, was to consult the senior military officer regarding precautionary measures, and was to warn the legislature that special funds may need to be allocated for defence purposes.

The Governor was also instructed to treat the dispatch itself as secret, to avoid panic, something he apparently did with indifferent success.

Subsequently, Governor Mac-Donnell reported that the Executive Council had "resolved" to propose an address of loyalty to the Throne. That was the only step taken in preparation for defence (43).

With the 1859 crisis over, South Australians ceased to fear the likelihood of attack by France. Indignation did run high in the colonies when the French introduced convicts into the Pacific, in 1864 and again in 1871, but the commercial and agrarian dissenters in South Australia were not unduly disturbed.

In fact, they quite welcomed this potential increase in consumer demands, which would have to be satisfied from Australia (44), and were only mildly concerned when France exported to New Zealand a potential danger to property, in the form of a few evicted communists (45).

The perfect navigation of the French cruiser *Magon,* visiting South Australia in 1885, aroused some suspicion. She seemed to know the coast too well. Nevertheless, her visit was made the occasion of great festivities (46), and the same friendliness prevailed during the

visit of the cruiser *Duchaffault* in 1888 (47).

By 1894, only one prominent South Australian remained who was still afraid of France — Sir Charles Todd, the Postmaster-General. He recommended the laying of a new cable from Singapore, via Labuan to Hong Kong, because it would "greatly add to the security of communications in the event of war with France ..." (48).

The Americans

American scares were of a different nature. The French presence in the Pacific had induced anxieties based, mainly, on memories of a traditional enemy. American scares, such as they were, introduced Australians to the danger of privateers and lone raiders, and set the pattern for hostile acts which could be expected to result from Australia's involvement in Empire wars.

South Australians were aware that Americans had been active in the Pacific. Their first contact, in 1837, was with the American whalers, employed by the *New South Wales Whaling Company*, ★ at the time mainly concerned with deep-sea sperm whaling and only intermittently engaged in bay whaling (49).

The only possibility of hostile involvement with the United States of America came in 1861 when England seemed on the verge of war with the Union (50).

It was not the American nation, but American individuals who posed a threat to Australia. When Commander Charles Wilkes made an unobserved landfall in Sydney on 2nd December, 1839, with four men-of-war, New South Wales became alarmed over the defenceless state of the Colony.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* for the next few years did not let its readers forget that "American ships, half whalers, half smugglers, half privateers ranged the entire coast of New Holland ..."(51). Fitzhardinge contends that the American privateers' success during the 1812-1814 war had made such an impression that they were not forgotten for another 40 years (52).

During the Crimean War privateers of another kind must have been feared, although only indirect evidence is available from a later historian. Since Russian fleets had been bottled up in Baltic and Pacific ports, it was said that Russian agents in America were endeavouring to equip privateers with mixed Russian and American crews (53).

The threat posed by privateers did not escape the notice of South Australian colonists. Although in 1861, the South Australian press discounted the probability of war with America, it did not rule out the possibility of "danger ... from lawless privateers who might make a sudden and stealthy approach to our shores and attempt a dash at our banks" (54).

It was this article, "suggesting the exercise of ordinary prudence" which brought forth one of the earliest detailed defence schemes in South Australia.

Fear of privateers led to a celebrated hoax★. On 16th February, 1871, the

★ See Chapter 1.

★ The background to the filibuster expedition was reported a few weeks later in the *Observer* (56), reprinted from the *Melbourne Age* (date unknown). Two colonial Agents-General were told by a Mr Stuart, a Tasmanian, that two young men, one calling himself Bethune and claiming to be the nephew of the Bishop of Toronto, had told him that a ship was being fitted out in America, nominally on behalf of France, but actually with the aim of raiding the principal Australian ports and the mail steamers. The plan was to slip through the Melbourne Heads at night, get alongside the *Nelson* capture her, turn her guns on the city and then levy blackmail upon the Treasury and the banks. Having been invited to join the venture, Mr Stuart feigned interest, but as soon as the two adventurers left for America, he divulged the scheme to the authorities.

Colonial Office sent the following message:

British Government have received statement which they do not credit but think it right to send, that a filibustering expedition is to leave the United States this month for Melbourne, Sydney and Otago (55).

The message caused little alarm even in New South Wales (57), and was totally discounted in South Australia (58), but the incident showed how inadequate communications would have been, if put to the test.

The cypher telegram from London was received at Ceylon on 16.2.1871. Exactly one month later, it reached the Governor of Queensland, having left Adelaide, after an unexplained delay, on the 14th March, going all the way via Wentworth and Sydney *in clear*, because "there were no cypher arrangements in Brisbane" (59). It was indeed fortunate that the threatened attack was a hoax.

The Russians

In Australia in the 19th century more scares were caused by Russia than by any other nation, although Australians had far more actual contact with the other powers which had ventured into the Pacific. Russia had become the bogeyman of the century.

The Russians came to the Pacific overland★. After Atlasov had explored Kamchatka, in 1697 to 1698, Russia's hold on the Pacific coast of North West Asia was firmly established.

Her sea-faring activities commenced with Peter the Great, and culminated in Behring's two expeditions of 1728-30 and 1740-41. In 1767, Alaska was declared a Russian Colony, whose rich fur resources were exploited by the Russian-American Company.

However, the main aim of the early Russian voyages into the Pacific was to gather scientific data, to train naval personnel, and to secure and maintain communications between Russia and the Orient.

The Russians called at Australian ports between 1804 and 1835, but not between 1836 and 1862. The Polish insurrection of 1830 created an anti-Russian climate; a more important reason was that, at the time, Australia had few surplus supplies which she could afford to sell.

There were no prospects of large scale trade between Russian settlements and Australian colonies (60) since the main Russian export was furs, in which Australians were hardly interested, and Australian-produced wool, grain and coal did not really interest the Russians.

Export quantities of grain were not produced regularly, while the belated use of steam power in Russian ships did not create a need for coal till after 1850.

Since peaceful, trade-based relations with Russia were unlikely, hostile confrontations appeared all the more probable, particularly in view of Russia's logistic and communication advantages over Great Britain (61).

Logistically, the main British naval force, on the China Stations, was at a disadvantage because coal supplies had to be obtained from Vancouver or from New South Wales.

Russia, on the other hand, had coal resources at her disposal on the Pacfic coast. As far as communications were concerned, Russia's advantage was even greater.

★ In tracing the history of Russia's presence in the Pacific, and her early contacts with Australia, the author has leaned on V.H. Fitzhardinge's 'Russian-Australian Relations in the 19th Century.'

A continuous wire connected St. Petersburgh with Vladivostock, which was itself in direct communication with Yokohama by means of cable, operated by the wholly Russian owned Danish Telegraph Line Company (62).

The British line of communication ended at the unprotected port of Hong Kong, and messages to other British possessions in the Pacific were subject to hostile interference.

In other words, the Russian Pacific fleet could be warned for action long before the British China Station would be alerted (63).

The Russians had one more advantage. Theirs was a combined naval and military command, while British naval and military policy and administration were totally uncoordinated.

Fears of Russian hostility towards British lands in Australia naturally increased during the Crimean War. After all, the Empire was at war with Russia. But there was no panic, no cries of *Hannibal ante portas.*

The safety of distance, and slowness of communications probably reduced any awareness of direct danger or of immediate involvement in the affairs of the Empire. This was to come later. However, during the crisis of 1858/59, a certain degree of Empire consciousness was already noticeable, more so than four years previously.

The following resolution was passed by the South Australian House of Assembly:

We assure Your Majesty of our resolution to resist to the utmost of our ability in defending and up-holding the integrity of the British Empire as well as in maintaining the security of this province (64).

and it should be noted that in this resolution the integrity of the Empire was considered first. The threat was to the Empire, rather than to the safety of the Colony.

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 caused little more concern than did the crises of 1859 or of the middle sixties, because British neutrality provisions were promulgated almost the day war broke out (65).

The Government's concern at the time (1870) was for the safety of communications. The line communication operated by the Anglo-Australian Telegraph Company Ltd, led from Galley (Ceylon), via Darwin, to Adelaide, from where the news was distributed to other colonies.

Still the line was not considered vulnerable enough to justify the alternative, a fast steamer standing by at either terminal (66).

During the war between Russia and Turkey, in 1877 and 1878, Britain just barely managed to remain neutral.

In South Australia there was genuine concern at the possibility of endangering the Colony by being drawn into Empire hostilities. Public meetings were held, as far away as Port Pirie.

A number of resolutions were passed demanding various military measures.

South Australians argued that if a hostile naval force did succeed in evading British squadrons on the high seas, it was not likely to attack the well-protected ports of Sydney and Melbourne, but it could well enter the St. Vincent Gulf undetected and threaten Adelaide.

Perhaps the answer lay in Sir William Jervois' suggestion: a South Australian man-of-war (67).

Thus, a minor attack by sea was thought possible, but South Australians realised that a large scale threat from Russia was unlikely, because she did not have the necessary military or financial

resources. Disraeli would drive a hard bargain, and win, while the Americans, although amicably disposed towards the Russians, would remain neutral, because they saw no profit in an alliance with Russia (68).

Disraeli did drive a hard bargain and there was no war. The colonists passed a resolution at the Town Hall meeting on 31.7.79, thanking the Prime Minister for his part in the Congress of Berlin.

Disraeli sent his thanks to the Mayor and his fellow colonists for a highly valued honour, and added that " ... at the same time I cannot refrain from conveying to you the sentiments of affection and pride with which England has received from the Members of her Colonial family the repeated evidence of their sympathy, their loyalty and their high spirit" (69).

Then came the Sudan crisis of 1885. Gladstone had to face the English nation over the fate of General Gordon, mourned by his relatives in Adelaide. In the same year the Pendjeh incident occurred.

The Russians had occupied Nerv in 1883 and an Anglo-Russian Commission had been formed to fix the frontiers of Afghanistan, but in 1885 the Russians embarked upon a punitive expedition, defeating the Afghans at Pendjeh, and appearing to threathen India. Gladstone was obliged to move troops from Africa to guard England's most valuable dominion.

One gathers from letters to the press, records of public meetings, the newspapers themselves and legislative proceedings that, during the stirring weeks of April and May, 1885★, fears of danger to the Empire came to be identified with fears of danger to the Colony.

South Australians referred to the Afghanistan frontier as their own: " ... the Russians ... must not be allowed to occupy the mountains contiguous to *our frontier*"★★ and insisted that

We at this remote part of the Queen's dominions are moved by the same hopes and fears and respond to the same incitements to patriotism as influence our fellow subjects in Great Britain (70).

But whatever sympathies the colonists shared with the common Englishman, whose aspirations might be thwarted if the colonial Empire disappeared, any suggestions of sending troops to India, thus actively defending the Empire, were considered preposterous (71).

" ... The interests of the Empire could best be served by keeping the troops here" (72). Danger to Empire meant danger to South Australia.

The press did its best to promote defence preparedness, if only by circulating every available rumour.

The *Observer* and the *Register*, for instance, reported that the Premier of Victoria had received advice from Singapore of a Russian warship, sailing from the Cape, bound for Australia.

A report of this nature produced some constructive suggestions, for instance the scheme for a watch along the east coast of Eyre Peninsula.

It also produced such nonsense as the proposal for keeping large stocks of charcoal, sulphur and saltpeter handy, for "mixing into a composition called gunpowder" (73).

1885 was also an election year, making it difficult to distinguish between election propaganda and genuine

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★ See Appendix G for a resume of South Australian newspaper articles dealing with the 1885 crisis.

★★ Author's italics

anxiety. At an election meeting in the Strathalbyn Institute on 14th April, 1885, a speaker suggested: "I do not suppose you up here in Strathalbyn are nearly so excited and scared at the prospects of war with Russia as the people in Adelaide ... (laughter) ... if the Government had done one-tenth of what had been suggested they should have been put into the lunatic asylum ..."(74).

At the same time, the *Observer*, normally a level-headed and responsible paper, gave every evidence of believing that Hannibal was indeed *ante portas*★.

Full-page articles were devoted to the defence effort. The public was told exactly what was being done to ensure its safety, including details of first line ammunition holdings at the gun positions.

South Australians appeared to be "imbued with the touching belief in the ubiquity and omnipotence of the British Fleet" (75) and, therefore, did not concern themselves prior to 1860 or so seriously with the possibility of threats to their hearths and homes from Russian raiders.

They changed their view when, in 1862, the Russian cruiser *Svetlana* passed through the heads of Port Phillip Bay without being examined by the coastal batteries. From that moment, South Australians began to face the defence problem likely to be posed by lone raiders (76).

Serious concern followed publication of a most bizarre story. During the Polish insurrection of 1863/1864, Rakowsky, a Polish officer serving on the *Bogatyr* under Admiral Popov, was said to have passed to his uncle in Melbourne information concerning a Russian plan to raid major ports on the eastern seaboard of Australia.

This information reached the Premier of Victoria, who in turn informed the Governor, Sir Charles Darling.

Alarmed, Darling alerted his own military authorities, and his colleagues in other colonies. By that time, however, the Polish insurrection had been crushed, and danger from the 1864 conflagration in Schleswig-Holstein had passed (77, 78).

Consequently, the story was kept quiet, until July, 1864, when an article in the *Times* created a political uproar in South Australia. The press even alleged that there was a Russian nobleman, spying in Australia (79) while the legislature capitalised on the incident to attack the Government, firstly for concealing the information and, secondly, for doing nothing about it (80).

The whole affair seemed barely credible, but it was possible that after the Crimean War, when her fleets were so successfuly bottled up in Baltic and Pacific ports, Russia realised that a repetition of the situation could only be avoided by striking hard at British commerce in distant waters, to draw British naval power away from the seat of hostilities.

Such a move would have caused fragmentation of British naval power and would have had the added advantage of the principle of surprise.

It was a new concept in naval warfare and the credit for this new strategy, utilised by the Germans in both World Wars, appears to belong to the Russians (81).

Major General Steward, General Officer Commanding in Victoria,

★ South Australia passed militia and volunteer acts, certain shipping regulations were promulgated and some precautionary measures were taken. For details, see Chapter IX.

reported an incident (82), not unlike the Rakowsky case in 1864. Since, to the best of the author's knowledge, it has not been published previously, it will be related here.

It began in Yokohama in the early seventies. A Royal Marine officer became acquainted with a Russian colonel allegedly a secret agent, who wished to marry an American from San Francisco.

The lady desired an English-speaking witness; the Royal Marine officer obliged. During the ensuing conviviality the plot leaked out.

Apparently the Russian colonel had brought with him detailed admiralty charts of the Australian coast-line, as well as operation plans and orders prepared by Admiral Lesofski of St Petersburg.

The Russian fleet at Yokohama was to be informed of a declaration of war within hours, thanks to the Vladivostok cable, and days before the British ships, cruising off Yokohama, and dependent on a fast packet bringing the news from the Hong Kong cable terminal, could learn of it.

The plan called for the Russian ships to leave port singly, and rendezvous at Lochoo for coaling. (Steward maintained in his memorandum that the coaling arrangement was confirmed by a member of the firm of Walsh, Hall & Co., who had sent part of a 1,100 ton coal consignment to the island in response to a Russian direction.)

The fleet, allegedly consisting of 17 cruisers and one iron-clad, was then to have proceeded to Newcastle, which was to be shelled and compelled to refuel the ships.

The next attack was to be on Sydney, forcing the city to hand over the bullion in the banks.

The same procedure was then to be repeated in Melbourne, from where the fleet was to sail around Australia, stop at Newcastle and make for San Francisco.

There the ships were to be left with maintenance crews, while the remainder of the personnel went overland to the East Coast, purchased new vessels, and sallied forth once more.

Although perhaps somewhat more credible than the Rakowsky story, there are one or two points which make Steward's report a curious tale.

A man of Steward's standing should have realised that, since the average British ship had a range of only 5,000 miles, and this did not allow for peak speed during fighting, or for loss of speed due to fouling of bottoms, then even if Russian ships had the range of the British vessels, they could scarcely have reached Brisbane, let alone Newcastle.

At the same time, the Royal Marine officer claimed the unlikely distinction of being in the full confidence of the Russian Admiral commanding the Asiatic squadron, whom he described as a man "who appears to have preserved the instinct of a true buccaneer", and whom he yet accused of unpardonable frankness over his *post prandial cups*: "Fancy one, after all, missing such a chance of attacking Australia: Six million sterling! Why, there would not have been such a coup since the days of the Spanish galleons!"

The possible consequences of naval strategy of this nature did not entirely escape notice in South Australia, but without arousing anxiety.

The visit of the Russian corvette *Bozarin* off Glenelg in May, 1870, hardly caused comment (83).

Then in February, 1882, the citizens of Glenelg awoke one morning to find

three Russian ships, the *Afrika, Vestnik* and *Platon*, commanded by Admiral Aslanbegoff, anchored offshore.

Adelaide had never before been honoured by a visit from Russian naval vessels (84) and the Major of Glenelg, on his own authority, invited them to anchor off Glenelg, turning their one week stay into a tourist attraction.

The visitors were lavishly entertained.

Admiral Aslanbegoff visited Port Adelaide and, judging from his utterances reported in the daily press, had not been aware of such extensive port facilities.

The Admiral's remarks would indicate that the Russian Admiralty had no precise information about the approaches to Adelaide (85).

The Russians, in turn threw, the *Afrika* open for public inspection. Her *fish torpedoes*, with a range of almost 750 yards, were particularly admired.

Governor Sir William Jervois organised a picnic at Mt Lofty, where he and the Admiral made a number of speeches. Loud cheers from the crowd accompanied Sir William's words: "This is the first time we have ever had a visit from a Russian squadron and we herald its advent to South Australian waters" (86).

The fact that the fleet had slipped unobserved past the Kangaroo Island signal station did not appear to disturb anybody.

The courteous and cheerful attitude displayed by South Australia toward the Russian visitors contrasted rather sharply with the hysteria and discourteous provocation, displayed by the Melbourne press, at that time running a campaign for the strengthening of Melbourne's defences and improvements in the volunteer movement (87).

The *Age*, in the early and middle eighties, was particularly vociferous in its anti-Russian sentiments.

It, too, fell victim to a hoax. This particular story concerned a secret dispatch, allegedly sent by the Russian Admiral, in code, through the Melbourne Post Office.

It outlined the plan for a lightning attack on Melbourne, to be followed by similar attacks on the other Australian ports and later on Fiji.

The hoaxer was an ex-New Caledonian convict, named Henry Bryant, alias Comte Henry de Beaumont. The incident, described in detail by Fitzhardinge (88), drew a sarcastic remark from the Earl of Kimberley when he commented on Sir William Jervois' enthusiastic report of progress in South Australia's defence preparedness: "It is to be hoped that they the colonists will someday 'progress' to the point where panics will not be caused by such silly hoaxes as that which scared Victoria the other day" (89).

A few attempts to keep the Russophobia alive still persisted after 1885, but no-one took any notice of the account of *How we captured Adelaide — from the private log of Captain Korfuloff, I.R.N.* (90), nor was there any reaction to Major-General A.B. Tulloch's worry about the inevitable war with Russia (91).

From 1892 onwards, fears of a conflict with Russia gradually vanished, despite frantic efforts of chauvinists like B.C. Craig, whose interest in keeping the Russian scare alive was purely commercial.

He was the agent for the Hotchkiss Ordnance Company and the Nobel organisation, which produced smokeless powder (92).

The Franco-Russian military convention, directed against Germany,

was followed in 1896, by the visits of Czar Nicholas II to France and England, and from that time the three countries moved rapidly towards the Entente Cordiale of 1904.

Fears of war between the British Empire and Russia occupied the minds of South Australians intermittently for about forty years, no matter what the realities of the situation were.

France, the United States of America, Japan and China played a lesser role.

These fears had created a defence awareness concerned with the hearths and homes of the colonies and with the Empire as a whole and which was the stimulant of defence preparations.

Throughout the discussion of possible threats to South Australian security there emerged the other aspect of defence for the Colony, namely, should the Colony remain in the British Empire, and thus become subject to the effects of European politics, or should the Colony separate and thus avoid becoming embroiled in Britain's wars.

Connections with the Empire and the Influence of European Politics

There was a growing feeling in Australia, after 1859, that its close connection with England was not altogether a blessing (93).

John Dunmore Lang of New South Wales was the first to express the idea of separation in his speech to the miners at Sofala on the Truron River.

Lang was convinced that, if Australia wanted to have peace and to avoid the ravages of war, independence was the only way to achieve this (94).

He advocated separation because he could not see how authority and liberty could be reconciled within the Empire, how a young and virile community could avoid becoming embroiled in affairs in which she had no say and over which she had no control.

He was not alone in expressing these sentiments. Sir Thomas McIllwraith, partner in the shipping firm of McIlwraith and McEacharn, would-beannexer of New Guinea and one time Premier of Queensland, Mr Justice Williams of Victoria, Sir George Dibbs of New South Wales, J.H. Barrow and P.M. Glynn, members of the South Australian House of Assembly, to mention but a few, held the same views.

Undoubtedly, these people were influenced by British opinion. The anti-colonial sentiments of the Manchester School, most strongly expressed in Gladstone's first ministry, made it quite clear to anybody who wanted to know, that the colonies were expected to separate.

On the other hand, the separation sentiment was by no means universal. South Australians felt that, while there undoubtedly was an argument for severing the ties with the Empire, "it would show much want of wisdom to cast off allegiance to a power that would have taken tremendous vengeance for ... an outrage committed by an enemy of England ..." (95).

The idea of separation was not seriously discussed until after 1859 when the war scare over the possible intervention by Great Britain in Italy had died down. Sir Richard MacDonnell told the Duke of Newcastle that " ... the Imperial Government should take cognisance that the Colony required protection only in wars in whose commencement or termination it had neither voice nor influence" (96).

One might read into this statement that South Australia wanted to be

protected in a war not of her own choosing, but otherwise was prepared to look after herself.

The Schleswig-Holstein crisis in 1864 brought a new element into the problem of connection with Empire, namely, the suggestion not so much of separation, but rather the right of neutrality, should Britain be involved in a war.

The notion of neutrality in South Australia was probably stronger than that of independence and complete separation from Britain. The fear was for loss of trade and bombardment of the city at the hands of an enemy with whom the South Australians really had no quarrel. The notion of neutrality appealed to the practical sense of dissenters.

It was a case of having the cake and eating it too. If attacked by a major power, the Colony would have every right to expect the assistance of the Crown. If England became involved in war over some European issue or other, the Colony would stay neutral, avoid having its harbour and city bombarded, and probably do roaring business with both sides.

The Victorian, Sir Charles Gavin Duffy, one time Premier and Chairman of a Royal Commission on Federal Union, was perhaps, the foremost advocate of the notion of neutrality, a notion shared by such prominent South Australian figures as H.B.T. Strangways and R.C. Baker.

His argument went even further. If the colonies, now being to all intents and purposes sovereign nations, were asked to defend themselves, they should also have the right of making treaties with foreign powers while, at the same time, Great Britain should not make treaties which were binding on the colonies (97).

In May, 1865, the *Observer,* under the heading *The Mother Country and the Colonies*, aired the whole concept of Empire relationships (98).

England's role appeared to be that of an affectionate and yet authoritative parent or, alternatively, that of the patronising big brother, "who reserves to himself the special privilege of lecturing us occasionally, but in return defends us against the rest of the world." The colonies might indeed be faced with occasional bombardment from a hostile power as a result of their connection with England, but England herself would have far more to lose if the colonies were independent.

She would lose prestige because she was vitally concerned with the integrity and dignity of the Empire. She needed the colonies as an outlet for her surplus population and, being a manufacturing country, she was obliged to remain on the best of terms with countries which produced her raw materials.

Nor would Australia's independence significantly have reduced England's expenditure. The *Observer* felt that the question of separation was not really relevant, because over the last few years Britain had, by and large, shown unquestionable good will and a desire to please colonies, simply by sanctioning any proposals the colonies made.

It was suggested that it would be wise for her (England) to continue this policy.

"If the Colonial Office assumed the same relationship to the colonies as the Queen holds to the other estates in the Constitution, it would merely reign over them, but not govern them" and as a result "the colonies would shine as satellites of the great central luminary with a distinction of their own,

determined, however, by their relation to the general system" (99).

These prophetic words were not generally appreciated, particularly by the more radical section of the community. The *Adelaide Times* certainly disagreed, but at the same time, it, too had some misgivings about separation. Australia's military weakness was an open invitation to a hostile power.

The local cash tills may as effectively be emptied, their the colonists' warehouses as completely ransacked, their women as grievously wronged by the epauletted warriors of European states as by those romantic bushrangers who have revived the memory of Dick Turpin in the secluded valleys of Australia (100).

It became clear by the late sixties that neutrality, rather than complete independence, was generally favoured in South Australia. At the same time there was a feeling that, although the Colony would always have to look towards a large military power for protection, this large military power need not necessarily be Great Britain.

For instance, it was suggested that the role could be filled by India, the only large military power in the East at the time (101). The suggestion was the first sign that there were people who already considered Australia to be part of Asia rather than a part of Europe.

John Henry Barrow, M.L.C., one of the South Australian delegates to the Inter-Colonial Conference in June, 1870, moved on that occasion that, since Britain had withdrawn Imperial troops, the Australian colonies should be accorded, by treaty or otherwise, the position of neutral states in the event of war (102).

Another South Australian, H.T.B. Strangways, also wanted neutrality but still expected the British Navy to safeguard the sea lanes (103).

Meanwhile in Britain the opposition to Empire waned, a change of heart generally attributed to a speech made by Benjamin Disraeli in the Crystal Palace in London in June, 1872. The formation of two organisations, the *Imperial Federation League* and the *Imperial Federation (Defence) League*, was an expression of the new look in Empire relationships. The old view, that Britain should be freed from the burden of protecting her colonies, began to disappear.

It was now envisaged that these same colonies should participate in the defence of the Empire as a whole.

This changed outlook was based firstly on the emergence of new strategic concepts and the fact that the change from sail to steam meant a reduced sailing range, unless the British Navy had coaling stations readily available.

Also, the Navy had, over the years, become the police force of the seas. This resulted in a degree of localisation and fragmentation of naval power, in contradiction to one of the main Principles of War, namely that of concentration of force.

The new concept of naval strategy required large and powerful capital ships, concentrated where they would be most effective in containing the naval forces of rival powers, and that was in European waters. The Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 was thus the first step towards removing British ships from duty on distant colonial stations.

The *new look* in Empire relations also had some politico-geogrpahical aspects. Despite the prophets of Empire dismemberment, people in the colonies were in no hurry to separate from England, or even to take concrete steps to ensure neutrality in time of war.

On the contrary, there were definite signs that the colonists were eager to contribute towards Empire defence. Thus colonies were beginning to be regarded in England as assets after all. Distances had shrunk, and improved communications made the vision of an integrated Empire quite feasible. Finally, the colonies were wealthy and populous and could be considered a source of material support for England.

The greater Britain could conceivably be transformed into a political union, something like the German Zollverein. The proponents of political union, or rather of federation, were concerned with the promotion of trade and the evolution of political machinery which would give the colonies a voice in Imperial matters.

While the general public in England had no clear idea of the meaning of Imperial Federation (104), the Australian public and press reacted sharply against the concept of political federation. There was suspicion that the colonies were being used to further British power ambitions, or else to lighten the financial burden of the British taxpayer.

There was fear, manifestly expressed by the *Bulletin*, that the growth of Australian nationalism would be stunted. The *Register* demanded, in what Hall called the most selfish voice of nationalism, that Australia's right of self-government be left intact and she must not have "any equal share of burden of Imperial expenditure" (105).

On the military side, the Imperial Federation (Defence) League was one of these semi-official organisations which published its addresses in the Royal United Services Institution, the Royal Colonial Institute and similar venues, and whose members were usually serving officers, whose views were respected.

The aims of the Defence League included the creation of an Empire Council, combination of the total resources of the Empire for defence, and the participation of self-governing colonies in bearing the cost of Empire defence. It was the last aspect to which the colonies objected.

Robert Muirhead Collins, the Secretary of the Melbourne Defence Committee, in 1894, explained that the colonists were not likely to become enthusiastic over Imperial Federation after the way England had treated Australia's interests in the Pacific, particularly with regard to New Guinea, the New Hebrides and New Caledonia (106).

South Australians at first appeared to support the military aim of the Defence League. "The only practicable method of maintaining the political integrity of an Empire, so widely scattered, is a combination for mutual defence....." (107).

Every rumour of war seemed to stimulate the colonies identification with the Empire.

" ... our honour was their honour, our interests their interests, our wars their wars" (108). But the early enthusiasm for participation in formalised Empire defence soon evaporated.

The *Observer*, on one occasion, pointed out that the Imperial Defence Federalists were unaware of the axiom that there should be no taxation without representation (109). As far as Empire defence commitments were concerned, the League failed to make its mark in South Australia.

Just as Imperial Federation failed to commend itself to South Australians, so as the 19th century drew to a close, the idea of neutrality gradually waned.

As early as 1870, the *Register*, the Colony's leading daily newspaper, was

not altogether convinced that neutrality would work. While neutrality had many advocates, the paper felt that the time for independence was not yet ripe (110).

A decade later the *Register* was convinced that separation was inevitable, but that it would come as the result of a European conflagration, rather than by the implementation of a political theory.

Unsure of the views of its readers, the newspaper was careful to dissociate itself from any strong pro-separation movement and rebuked those who advocated it, particularly if they were Victorians (111).

Still, in 1887 the *Register* stated quite categorically that "there is no disguising the fact that the chief danger to the colonies arises from their connection with England." (112).

By 1888 the paper admitted that "Eventually separation may be inevitable — we cannot tell" (113), and in the following year retreated to the view that, "there are very many in Australia who think things are tending towards separation ... but few would want that if closer unity were in any way possible"(114).

In November of the same year the paper was quite adamant that separation should be avoided (115). Thereafter, any mention of neutrality was part of a series of gestures to indicate merely that South Australia was not receiving the attention it deserved in London.

In retrospect, it might be said that fears of Russian attacks upon the shores of the colony or war between Russia and the Empire dominated considerations of defence in South Australia.

Thus the question "Who is the enemy?" was interwoven with the question "What is our relationship with Great Britain in wars in which she is involved?".

One must accept that by and large, there was no militant agitation for separation, or even for neutrality in the event of war. The two alternatives were debated in a rather desultory fashion, with the inevitable conclusion that, irrespective of the final solution, self-defence *within the Empire* was the only pracitical solution.

Although South Australians from the middle eighties onwards were rather more Empire conscous than they had been earlier, they were still not disposed to share with England the burden of Empire defence.

If they accelerated their defence preparedness it was probably not due to any desire to participate in the expansion of the Empire. The major stimulant for their defence efforts in the third quarter of the 19th Century was an awareness of the dangers associated with being members of the British Empire.

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The R.A.N's First Submarines

IN 1913 Commander H.G. Stoker, DSO, a R.N. man, became the commanding officer of one of two submarines acquired by the Australian Navy as the nucleus of a flotilla.

The two submarines, AE1 and AE2, were at the time the latest class and larger by far than any predecessor.

Stoker commanded the AE2 — a long slim cigar of steel, her machinery-packed innards drove her 800 tons with 1750 horsepower.

She mounted bow torpedo tubes and carried eight torpedoes, though no gun was fitted. Her crew was evenly divided between British and Australian.

On March 2, 1914, after extensive trials, AE1 and AE2 slipped out of Portsmouth bound for Sydney, where they arrived on May 24.

They were the first submarines operated by the R.A.N., and the first to sail halfway round the world, including nine thousand miles from Portsmouth to Sydney under their own power.

AE2 had two other firsts — she was the first and only submarine to escort a contingent of the 1st A.I.F. across the Indian Ocean, and the first undersea craft to breach the generally considered impassibility of the Dardanelles.

Soon after he outbreak of war in August 1914, both submarines were employed in the hunt for von Spee's squadron in the Pacific during which AE1 was lost with all hands.

She disappeared somewhere in the depths off New Britain.

After von Spee had been driven from the Pacific and his squadron finally liquidated at the Falklands, AE2's captain, champing at the bit in Sydney, applied for, and was granted, permission to proceed to European waters.

And so on December 31, 1914, the sub found herself escort to the 15,000 troops in massed transports which formed up off King George's Sound and set course for the Mediterranean — and Gallipoli.

The trip across was uneventful and AE2 finally slipped in under the lee of Tenedos Island and joined the British Fleet waiting for the landing.

The submarine man lost no time in submitting his plan for breaching the Straits, and at Lemnos the Admiral sent for him.

When he left, Stoker had his permission to have a go.

Stoker, whose study of his target had revealed extreme difficulties, had no illusions regarding the task ahead.

The Straits are thirty-five miles long, and only half a mile wide at Chanak.

Sheltering behind its defences — submarine nets, thickly-sown minefields, destroyers, gunboats, heavy shore batteries and closely-spaced searchlights — was the Turkish Fleet, backed up by the German ships Goeben and Breslau.

Added to this lot were an old bridge hauled from Constantinople and sunk in the narrow neck off Nagara Point, danger of raising periscope in a minefield, with subsequent navigational hazard, and a constant three-to-five-knot current sweeping into the Mediterranean, which, with AE2's fifty-mile submerged distant limit in still water, would force her to surface frequently.

The first attempt was made after moonset a few days before the landing.

A diving rudder shaft broke as she was about to dive through the entrance at dawn, and the adventurers returned to base.

Early morning, Sunday April 25, she again left the vast concourse of ships in Mudros Harbour and headed north towards the great eyes of light that opened from Dardanelles' cliffs and swept the sea beneath.

At twenty feet AE2 slid unseen towards the Straits then, diving to seventy feet, she headed directly for the main mine-field in the Straits' entrance.

All hands waited. Soon it came — the first scraping, starting for'ard, then jolting and knocking aft. Then on the other side — the tenuous, swaying steel coils.

Every instant the men inside, listening, waited for a projection on the hull to catch on a wire and, with her surge through the water, to drag the explosive bulbs down.

For an hour it went on, until, rising for the third time, Stoker's periscope told him they were through.

It also offered information to other eyes, and inside they heard the crash of exploding shells as subdued shocks, and the falling shrapnel as hail on their thin steel roof.

Abreast Chanak the first fruits of their ordeal presented themselves — an old battle-ship, destroyers in the distance, and a small cruiser, probably a mine-layer, sliding slowly from behind the former's bulk.

A long shape exploded from AE2's bow tube and reached out to the cruiser. They felt the concussion of the hit as they dived beneath a speeding destroyer.

Hounded by shells, destroyers and gunboats, AE2 grounded on the shore, dragged off, had a quick peep at boats pulling in survivors from the cruiser, then speared up-Strait at full speed, trailing the hunt behind her.

For five days AE2 successfully dodged destroyers and gunboats meanwhile creating havoc among the enemy supplyships. A wireless message to base with the electrifying news that British submarine was loose among the enemy shipping had an important bearing on the conduct of the Gallipoli campaign — but AE2's days were numbered.

On the fifth day, in the process of a normal dive, AE2 suddenly went beserk.

She flicked her bows up and drove straight to the surface.

She broke surface like a floundering whale, and the torpedo-boat's guns broke into flame and smoke.

The fore tank was filled. This pulled her nose down — and under she went.

Down she went, and kept on going, completely out of control.

The gauge needle swung hard against its stop, and stayed there — then reluctantly the needle left its stop and, slowly, came up.

Her advent to the surface was met by two torpedoes from the torpedoboat and salvoes from the gunboat.

AE2 solved the problem by heading bottomwards then spinning upwards where she cleared the water stern first.

Scuttled by the captain, AE2 went to her watery grave; her captain and crew to a P.O.W. Camp, but both submarine and crew thoroughly earned their honoured place in history.

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Dr. Mary Walker, Medal of Honor Winner

by ANTHONY STAUNTON

Dr. Mary Walker is the only woman in America to be awarded that country's highest military honour — the Medal of Honor.

She received the Medal from the hands of President Andrew Johnson on November 11, 1865, in recognition of her work as a surgeon during the American Civil War.

But 53 years later — shortly before Dr. Walker died aged 86 — the honour was revoked by Congress.

Late in 1976 a campaign was mounted in Washington to restore the Medal to Dr. Walker posthumously.

The leader of the campaign to restore the Medal of Honor citation to Dr. Walker was her great grandniece Anne Walker of Washington.

In 1977 the United States Army Board for Correction of Military Records met and recommended that all US Army records be corrected to show Dr. Walker was validly awarded the Medal of Honor.

The Medal of Honor is the highest military award for bravery that can be given to any individual in the United States of America. Conceived in the early 1860s, the Medal of Honor was first presented in 1863.

The Medal of Honor is presented to its recipients by a high official "in the name of the Congress of the United States". For this reason it is sometimes called the Congressional Medal of Honor.

As a general rule, the Medal of Honor may be awarded for a deed of personal bravery or self-sacrifice above and beyond the call of duty only while the person is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States in action against an enemy of the United States, or while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. However until passage of Public Law 88-77, the Navy could and did award Medals of Honor for bravery in the line of the naval profession. Such awards recognised bravery in saving life, and deeds of valour performed in submarine rescues, boiler explosions, turret fires, and other types of disaster unique to the naval profession.

In their provision for judging whether a person is entitled to the Medal of Honor, each of the armed services has set up regulations which permit no margin of doubt or error. The deed of the person must be proved by incontestable evidence of at least two eye-witnesses; it must be so outstanding that it clearly distinguishes his gallantry beyond the call of duty from lesser forms of bravery; it must involve the risk of his life; and it must be the type of deed which, if he had not done it, would not subject him to any justified criticism.

A recommendation for the Army or Air Force Medal must be made within two years from the date of the deed upon which it depends. Award of the Medal must be made within three years of the date of the deed. The recommendation for a Navy Medal of Honor must be made within three years and awarded within five years.

MEDAL OF HONOR ROLL, 1916

On April 27, 1916, Congress approved an Act which provided for the creation of a "Medal of Honor Roll", upon which honourably discharged Medal recipients who earned the Medal in combat and who had attained the age of 65 years were to be recorded, with each enrolled person to receive a special pension of $10.00 per month for life. The primary purpose of this Act was to give Medal recipients the same special recognition shown to holders of similar British and French decorations for valour. Limiting the award to the nominal sum of $10.00 monthly emphasised it was not given as a pension, but to provide a small amount for personal comforts in the advanced years of life, at a time when needs are generally not very acute, especially in cases in which the veteran is in receipt of pension benefits. The amount was not made larger both because it was contrary to the policy of Congress to recognise distinguished service by pensions, and because to combine an award for conspicuous gallantry with a pension would diminish the honour attached to the award of the Medal.

The passage of this Act marked the successful culmination of a 26-year effort by the Medal of Honor Legion — the organisation of Medal recipients which was formed back in 1890 — to obtain, in the words of one of its documents, "such legislation from Congress as will tend to give the Medal of Honor the same position among the military orders of the world which similar medals occupy". Bills aimed at this type of legislation had been introduced into Congress recurrently following the organisation of the Medal of Honor Legion — none of them meeting with success.

The successful bill was introduced by Representative Isaac R. Sherwood, of New York, who was a Civil War veteran, breveted brigadier general by Lincoln. He had fought in 43 battles, being under fire 123 days, and had been complimented in special orders for gallantry in action six times. He had led a full-dress congressional discussion of the Medal of Honor question on the floor of the House on July 6, 1914.

The Act of April 27, 1916, provided for enrolment "upon written application being made to the Secretary of the proper department" — War or Navy — "and subject to the conditions and requirements hereinafter contained," of "the name of each surviving person who has served in the military or naval service of the United States in any war, who has attained or shall attain the age of sixty-five years....". It then laid down the condition that the applicant's Medal of Honor should have been earned by action involving actual conflict with an enemy, distinguished by conspicuous gallantry or intrepidity, at the risk of life, above and beyond the call of duty.

The Act specified that the Secretary of War or of the Navy would be responsible to decide whether each applicant would be entitled to the benefits of the Act.

If the official award as originally made appeared to the War Department to conform to the criteria established by the statute, this automatically entitled the applicant to the pension without further investigation. If, on the other hand, a doubt arose as to whether or not the applicant was entitled to entry on the Roll, then, to quote the Act further, "all official correspondence, orders, reports, recommendation, requests and other evidence now on file in any public office or department shall be considered".

ADVERSE ACTION
MEDAL OF HONOR BOARD, 1917

What was to be done if, after the consideration of these documents, the War Department felt that the applicant was ineligible, was defined on June 3, 1916, in section 122 of the Army reorganisation bill. This Act provided for appointment by the Secretary of War of a board of five retired general officers for the purposes of "investigating and reporting upon past awards or issue of the so-called Congressional Medal of Honor by or through the War Department; this with a view to ascertain what Medals of Honor, if any, have been awarded or issued for any cause other than distinguished conduct ... involving actual conflict with an enemy ...".

"And in any case", this Act continued, "in which said board shall find and report that said Medal was issued for any cause other than that hereinbefore specified, the name of the recipient of the Medal so issued shall be stricken

permanently from the official Medal of Honor list. It shall be a misdemeanor for him to wear or to publicly display such Medal, and, if he shall still be in the Army, he shall be required to return said Medal to the War Department for cancellation".

By October 16, 1916, the Board created by this Act had met, gathered all Medal of Honor records, prepared statistics, classified cases and organised evidence which might be needed in its deliberations. Between October 16, 1916, and January 17, 1917, all of the 2,625 Medals of Honor which had been awarded up to that time were considered by the Board, and on February 15, 1917, 911 names were stricken from the list.

Of these 911 names, 864 were involved in one group — a case in which the Medal had been given to members of a single regiment. The regiment's (27th Marine Volunteer Infantry) enlistment was to have expired in June of 1863. As an inducement to keep the regiment on active duty during a critical period, President Lincoln authorised Medals of Honor for any of its members who volunteered for another tour of duty. The 309 men who volunteered for extended duty, in the face of more action and possible death, certainly were demonstrating 'soldierlike" qualities, and a such were entitled to the Medal of Honor under one proviso of the original law. But their act in no way measured up to the 1916 standards. A clerical error compounded the abuse. Not only did the 309 volunteers receive the Medal, but the balance of the regiment, which had gone home in spite of the President's offer, was awarded it also. In this group case as well as in the remaining 47 scattered cases, the Board felt that the Medal had not been properly awarded for distinguished services, by the definition of the Act of June 3, 1916. Among the 47 others who lost their Medal were William F. Cody, better known as Buffalo Bill, and Mary Walker.

In its final report, the Board indicated that in the large majority of cases, "the Medals have been awarded for distinguished conduct in action, measuring that term by the highest standard, and there can be no question as to the propriety of the award".

In some cases, the Board reported, the rewards the men received were "greater than would now be given for the same acts", but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, "and because there has been no high judicial interpretation of the Medal of Honor laws" the Board found that there were "but few instances where the Medal has not been awarded for distinguished services".

The 911 cases which did not pass the Board's investigation were turned over to the War Department, and against each of the names involved was stamped the inscription, "Stricken from the list February 15, 1917, Adverse Action Medal of Honor Board — A.G. 2411162".

ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS, 1977

On May 4, 1977, under the chairing of Charles E. Woodside of the US Army, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records handed down its report in the case of Dr Mary Walker. The conclusions of the Board were as follows.

1. That although this Board does not know what information the Board of General Officers had available when they considered the case in 1916-17, it appears that they may not have had sufficient information regarding the circumstances of her distinguished service, which found the basis for President Johnson's award of the Medal to properly evaluate her case; that it should be noted that the deceased was employed as a contract surgeon and no service records were maintained on her, as were on military personnel; that the Board of General Officers apparently considered the case, based on the limited evidence of record at the time.
2. That based on the evidence now available it appears that the Board of General Officers may have erred in this particular case; that although there is no one particular act of heroism, which is traditionally associated with the award of the Medal of Honor, there is evidence to show distinguished gallantry at the risk of life in the face of the enemy; that the records show the deceased was a prisoner of war for over four months; that she treated the wounded on the field of battle and went back and forth into enemy territory to administer to the sick and wounded of the military and civilian population; that such actions were of such a nature and also above and beyond the call of duty.
3. That the Board is aware that under the law, only her actions while under official contract as an Army surgeon can be considered for award of the Medal of Honor; that, however, the circumstances of this case are very unique, in that it took place during a period of our nation's history when a female was not tendered a commission in the Army; that the Board takes note that the deceased volunteered her services as a doctor during the initial stages of the Civil War and feels that, had it not been for her sex, she would in all probability have been tendered a commission in 1861; that particular note is made of the fact that she freely gave her time and services as a doctor, to the benefit of the sick and wounded of the Army, both in the field of battle and in hospitals, despite having been denied a commission, and prior to the award of a contract as a surgeon.

4. That when consideration is given to her total contribution; her acts of distinguished gallantry, self-sacrifice, patriotism, dedication and unflinching loyalty to her country, despite the apparent discrimination because of her sex, the award of the Medal of Honor appears to have been appropriate; that the award was in consonance with the criteria estalished by the Act of April 27, 1916, and in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service.
5. That in view of the foregoing findings and conclusions, the action taken in 1917 to remove the deceased's name from the Medal of Honor Roll, was unjust.

On June 10, 1977, the following recommendation of the Board was approved and implemented by the US Army.

"That all of the Department of the Army records pertaining to MARY E. WALKER be corrected to show that she was validly awarded the Medal of Honor by President Johnson in 1865; that her name was selected to be entered on the Medal of Honor Roll, in accordance with the Act of June 3, 1916, and that the action taken in 1917 to remove her name from the Medal of Honor Roll is void and of no force, or affect".

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Donavan, Frank: *The Medal.* Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1971.

Mitchell, Joseph B: *The Badge of Gallantry.* The MacMillan Co., New York, 1968.

Committee of Veteran Affairs: *Medal of Honor Recipients 1863 — 1973.* US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1973.

United States Army: *Proceedings, Army Board for Correction of Military Record, 4 May 1977.*

BOOK REVIEWS

THE VARANGIANS OF BYZANTIUM — An aspect of Byzantine military history. Sigfus Blondal (translated, revised and rewritten by Benedikt S. Benedikz), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, 230 x 150 mm, xiii, 242 pp., index, cloth, £15 (U.K.).

It is difficult for us to make an imaginative leap to a period six hundred or more years ago when our modern political and military boundaries did not exist. It is hard for us to conceive of a world before the emergence of our modern nation states where what we know as patriotic pride was not a sentiment associated with geographical location, but (at least in the case of Varangians and other Vikings) might be described as pride in unquestioning allegiance to a chosen leader or in unflinching service to a band of comrades who held a purpose, rather than a piece of land, in common.

Because of this difficulty, histories of the Viking expansion of the 9th to the 12th centuries are often partial distortions brought about by our regarding medieval movements of settlers, raiders and traders as we would the movement of invasion forces today. Most of us are familiar, for example, with the image of the Viking as a blood-thirsty pirate who was stoutly resisted for so long by the plucky and patriotic English who to a man (and a woman) resented the paganism, greed and inclination for rapine and rape exhibited by these loathed "foreigners". However if we trust less biased historical evidence and use a little common sense, it will be clear that the motives prompting the outward movement of Scandinavian people in this period were as much the desire to trade, colonize, farm and generally cohabit congenially with their new countrymen, as to plunder monastries and create mayhem.

The *Varangians of Byzantium* makes this point in an exceedingly painstaking investigation of one less popularly recognized aspect of the medieval Scandinavian expansions. The Vikings, from about 800 to 1000 A.D. had a quite remarkable record of expansion and colonization. They settled Iceland, Greenland and spent at least some time in North-Eastern America. Olaf the White had founded a Kingdom in Dublin by 852, and most of England was under Viking rule by 1013, and by the middle of the ninth century, some Viking bands had raided Spain and were familiar with the Mediterranean.

It is not so widely realised however, that the Scandinavian peoples also moved east at this time. During the ninth century, it was Viking merchant adventurers who set up such cities as Novgorod and Kiev as fortified trading posts, and by the 10th century, had used the Volga to descend to the Black Sea to raid the riches of the Byzantine empire.

Obviously, seafaring adventures on this scale, regardless of the motives behind them, must have relied to as large extent on an advanced development of the skills of navigation, seamanship and military mobility among the Vikings. Viking fighting groups also had a reputation for loyalty and commitment to their leader and their cause. The *Varangians* probably derive their name from a Norse word *varar* meaning "troth" or "loyalty". These qualities recommended the Viking very strongly as a mercenary soldier, particularly to the Byzantine emperors, beset with the problems of maintaining control of a far-flung empire many of whose major routes were seaways.

The *Varangians of Byzantium* is an investigation of the origins, status and exploits of the groups of Vikings who were so successful as mercenary armies in and around Constantinople from the late 10th to the 14th centuries. It is a scholarly book, devoted as much to a painstaking investigation of the veracity of source materials and the accuracy of subsequent historical accounts, as it is to presenting a readable historical account of the Varangian phenomenon. It suffers stylistically I feel, from the philological and historical fastidiousness of its author and reviser.

— W. Krebs

THE MILITARY AND AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE, Mediansky, F.A. ed., Longman Cheshire, 1979. Our copy from the publishers.

This slender volume (165 pages) has on the face of it little if any bearing on aims and objectives of the Military Historical Society of Australia, but since its members by inference must be interested in the defence of Australia, the book is an absolute *must* for anybody concerned with the contemporary Australian military history. The book is unique in a number of respects. Of the eight contributors, half are serving regular officers at a level where short and long red-tab career considerations do not govern exclusively what they say or think.

Secondly, the book brings home, unmistakingly, the plain fact that the overall defence "situation" is so fluid that any recourse to patterns, either (supposedly) established or said to be emerging, is doomed to failure.

The third and perhaps most important unique feature of this collection of essays is that it has isolated and crystallised the two most important aspects of defence in the absence of a perceived threat to the country: what is the best mechanism for developing and constantly modifying a defence policy and what is the best way to train the people responsible for implementing this policy.

The best way to read this book is to begin with the review chapter by Dr. R. O'Neill to obtain an overall historical review of the problems and appreciate broadly the points made by the contributors. Very few readers will have problems with the first part of the book. However the second part, that dealing with the formal education of officers, will, for many years to come, be hotly debated. In some respects the Anti-Caseyites have it easy: the objective of training a soldier, both officer and other rank is to kill efficiently. The pro-Caseyites have a much harder road in front of them. It will be difficult to demonstrate the need for officers to "be brought close to the frontiers of professional knowledge if just a few of them are ever to dare to probe beyond established practice" (p 160). The difficulty of coming to grips with the tri-service academy problem is best illustrated by Major P. Mench who after a lengthy and scholarly lead-up to the current situation presents a "two bob each way" solution which to the reviewer is not very convincing.

Not only is the book a *must*, it is eminently readable. One picks it up and does not put it down till the last of the 161 pages are read and re-read.

— H. Zwillenberg

HISTORIA MILITARIS POLONICA, Warsaw 1977.

The book is a collection of essays brought together by the Polish Ministry of Defence Publishing House. The collection is in four parts, articles, extracts from official documents and files, book reviews and bibliography of important Polish writings on Military History published between 1972 and 1974.

The first two articles deal with warfare in the 17th century as exemplified by the two famous commanders Jan Sobieski and Josef Naronowicz-naronski. The article on Sobieski, written by J. Wimmer appears to "lean" on Clausewitz, but only superficially so.

The writer has produced his article virtually in two parts, one dealing with some of Sobieski's campaigns followed then by an interpretation of his methods of command. While Sobieski is generally known to most students of seventeenth Century European history, the same cannot be said of the 17th century Polish military engineer, Naronski, written up by Tadeusz Marian Nowak. The engineer served the Brandenburg dynasty for eighteen years. However, his main contribution as far as the military historian is concerned, is his books on military mathematics and in particular his 1650 artillery manual and his very extensive treatise on fortifications. Both articles are extremely well documented.

The other articles are set in the World War II era. The first by M. Porwitis is on the September 1939 campaign of the Crawdow army which had the task of opposing the German advance from Silesia. While reasonably well documented, particularly as far as German comments of this part of the campaign are concerned, the absence of appropriate maps makes the account difficult to follow.

The next two articles by P. Matusak and B. Kobuszewski respectively, deal with resistance warfare against the German occupation. Of particular value to the student of this form of warfare is the first because of the detailed account of the organisational and logistic problems that were encountered and had to be overcome.

The campaign against the German-occupied railways system in Poland is in fact complementary to the contents of the aforementioned article on the resistance campaigns. The dimension of the clandestine warfare against the German rail transport can only be appreciated when one learns that in a relatively short time over one hundred major attacks were carried out. Both these articles contain aspects of the second world war which are not generally known. Of particular interest to some of our readers is W. Begianski's account of the part played by Polish troops in the defence of Tobruk in 1941, namely the Independent Carpathian Infantry Brigade, the only formation of the Polish regular army which between 1940 and 1942 fought on land side by side with the Allies.

The next two articles deal with the activities of the Polish People's Army in the conquest of Pomerania in March-April 1945 and with the role played by the army in the reconstrucion of the country. The last article is an account of the development of the Polish army between 1943 and 1975. In summary, the reviewer found all of these articles quite fascinating. The organisation of the material is sound and the relatively few translation blemishes do in no way distract from the presentation.

The documents are mainlv concerned with investigations into the Warsaw uprising of 1944 and in particular with the role played by S.S. General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. Unless particularly interested in this facet of World War II, this part has little value to the student of military history.

Part III of the book under consideration contains very extensive reviews of some recent Polish publications. However, only the first two are of interest to the military historian, the others have distinct political science flavour with little or no military content.

Part IV is a reading list quoting just on 200 titles of Polish military historical writings published between 1972 and 1974.

In conclusion, one can only say that the publications totally in English with French summaries is fascinating. It shows the dimensions of the military-historical effort of Poland. *Sabretache* was fortunate to receive this book for review because it presents an historical perspective of recent and not so recent military historical events, virtually unknown to many if not most Australian readers.

— H. Zwillenberg

THE ARMY IN AUSTRALIA 1840-1850, M. Austin, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1979. Recommended price $16.20.

Brigadier M. Austin, DOS, OBE, has long been known as a scholar in the field of pre-federation military history of Australia. Articles in the *RHSA Journal,* and in *Sabretache* bear witness to his historical activities. The present book, subtitled *Prelude to the Golden Years* is the outcome of many years of painstaking research sponsored by the Australian Department of Defence. The extremely well-produced, well-illustrated and reasonably priced book is difficult to review, particularly by one who has known of the author since the war and who has had regular personal contact with him over the last five years.

At the outset it must be said that Austin's work is a "must" for anyone seriously interested in the military aspects of the Australian heritage. The attention to detail particularly in respect of documentation of the primary sources, generally not very easily accessible, is unparalled. From this point of view alone the book is invaluable — it provides the ground work for a number of studies which could be undertaken into the history of the formative decades of Australia.

Secondly, the book provides an insight into the sociology of the Imperial army which leaves the student of military history wondering how the miserable conditions of the British soldier created a morale that made it possible for the map of the world to be painted red.

However, a fair comment must be made both as far as the organisation of the material and the contents of the book are concerned. In the first instance, the reader would look in vain for the aim of the book, either in the introduction or in the conclusion, although there is some indication in General Dunstan's foreword.

Secondly, Chapter 1 entitled *The World Scene* bears little if any relation to the army in Australia and where it does, such relation is quite tenuous. The discussion of the military post at Port Essington is a case in point.

The reviewer of this book had difficulties in following the trend of Chapter 4, *Intercolonial Movement.* It contains in fact two aspects which would have been better kept separate. The first part deals with the Imperial troops, their strength, activities etc in New Zealand, Van Diemens Land, South Australia, followed again with a sub-chapter, headed *New Zealand* actually contributing little to the problem of troop requirements.

This then is followed by another sub-chapter, entitled *Force Adjustment — New South Wales, Van Diemens Land,* a third instalment on New Zealand followed by further sections on some of the other colonies, repetitive only in the sense that they deal with force adjustments of establishments in the various colonies described at the beginning of the chapter. Incidentally, a brief exposition of the principles underlying the British Australia Command would have been helpful.

The reviewer while noting this somewhat unorthodox organisation of the material, really has no sugestion to offer how else it could have been done, particularly bearing in mind the numerous asides which make the book so extremely readable and such a mine of information. The mention of what was probably the first instance of ordnance production in Australia is a case in point (p117).

Chapter 5, *Development of Australian Coastal Defences* written by Major C. Winter, is a well-rounded account, but because it is written by somebody else, it does not fit easily into Austin's narrative. Winter's chapter would have been more valuable as a stand-alone section.

As indicated before, the book provides a comprehensive insight into the conditions of the British soldier at that time. Particularly Chapter 3, *The Argonauts* and to a lesser extent the last chapter (conclusion) shows the difficulties under which the British soldier lived and worked. The wealth of the information brought together in this book is unique and to the best of the reviewer's knowledge has never been attempted before. The wealth of detail is best appreciated when one realises that one third of the book consists of "data". The book is well indexed and the bibliography, while not very extensive is more than adequate. The inclusion of McGuffie's *Rank and File* or of De Watterville's *The British Soldier* would not have gone amiss.

Despite some of the foregoing criticisms Brigadier M. Austin has made a very major contribution to colonial history in general and to Australian military history in particular.

— H. Zwillenberg

BUTTONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY 1855-1970, by Howard Ripley, Arms and Armour Press Ltd., 64 pages, hard cover and sells retail at $12.95. Distributed by Thomas C. Lothian Pty. Ltd., 4-12 Tattersalls Lane, Melbourne, Vic, 3000.

The book is a deluxe presentation printed on glossy paper 5½ x 8¾ inches profusely illustrated with 50 sharp photographs each showing at least 13 examples of buttons. It also contains a 1979/80 price guide, as well as a brief history on the introduction and changes in buttons used by the British Army.

I believe that this book would be a valuable addition to the reference bookshelf not only for the military button collector but for the general enthusiast. Military button collecting has for many years been overlooked in favour of medals and badges, but now provides a reasonably inexpensive field for the new or young collector. Valuable examples may still be found in a variety of junk and curio shops, and this publication is an easy reference guide that if necessary could be carried in a pocket.

— Robert Courtney

THIS is the sixth in a series of articles on tanks and armoured fighting vehicles which helped shape our military history.

Each of the vehicles featured is now located at the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Tank Museum, Puckapunyal Army Camp, Victoria.

Vehicle details and photographs are from the Tank Museum's magazine.

TANKS OF THE PAST

CRUISER TANK MK I, AUSTRALIAN SENTINEL

The Australian Army first proposed the building of an Australian tank to provide tanks for the A.I.F. in the Middle East. That tanks might also be required to defend Australia should Japan enter the war was fully realised. At the time, British factories were fully occupied preparing for the threatened German invasion and there was little hope of obtaining tanks from the United States. An Australian design team with British leadership was set up to produce an Australian designed and built tank.

One of the great problems facing the designers was the lack of suitable engines. They finally decided to adopt the 1940 model Cadillac motor car petrol engine by combining 3 engines into a single power unit.

The first automotive pilot model was delivered in January 1942 and tested at Puckapunyal in February. The first model, the Mark 1, mounted a 2 pounder gun and 66 were delivered to the Army.

However, none were used in operations because by the time they came off the assembly line, mastery of the sea lanes had been won and American Grant tanks were arriving in Australia in sufficient numbers to equip three Australian Armoured divisions. The 'Sentinel' was however, used as a training vehicle for a number of years.

The hull consisted principally of four main castings of armour plate. These were the nose, main body, turret and power unit cover plates.

The nose was a separate casting bolted to the machined face of the main body; it housed the front axle drive assembly, braking components, final drive and gear box.

The main body was a large one piece casting to which all the above mentioned smaller castings were fitted. The main body had three compartments, front, centre, and rear.

The front compartment housed the driver and forward gunner, the driver's compartment being on the right. On the left was situated the forward (or hull) gunner who controlled the armour protected Vickers machine gun.

This gun was water cooled by utilizing an electric pump in conjunction with a water storage reservoir. The vehicle gear box was situated between the front gunner and driver, as was the gear-box oil cooler and the associated cooling radiator and fan.

In the centre (or fighting) compartment, above the floor, were the drive shafts, transfer box and master clutch, as well as electrical and control conduits. A wheel operated escape hatch was provided on either side of the hull.

The rear compartment housed the power unit, radiator, petrol tanks and cooling fan. The three engines were mounted in cloverleaf or Y fashion. Each engine had its own drive shaft coupled to a transfer box which transferred the combined power of the three engines to the master clutch through a single drive shaft.

From the clutch, drive was transmitted to the gear box, then controlled differential and then to the

track drive sprocket via the final drive.

Mounted in the turret was the fighting basket which accommodated the commander, gunner and loader. The commander's station (cupola) formed the left side of the turret.

The gunner sat forward of the commander to operate the 2 pounder main armament and coaxial mounted vickers machine gun. On the right of the turret was the loader who loaded the guns and monitored the tank wireless.

The tank was suspended on three identical bogie assemblies on each side, and these conisted of a bogie bracket, two bell crank mounted road wheels (volute sprung) and a small top roller. Tracks were either all steel or rubbber padded steel links. Either type of track could be fitted with bolt on grousers.

Two other Marks were produced, the Mark III and the Mark IV. The Mark II was never produced.

A summary of the Sentinal Marks is as follows:

Mark I:
2 pounder gun and coaxial Vickers .303 inch machine gun in the turret with a hull Vickers machine gun.

Mark III:
25 pounder gun and coaxial. .303 inch Vickers (a modification carried twin 25 pounder guns).

Mark IV:
17 pounder gun and coaxial. .303 inch Vickers.

Although the Sentinel never saw action, in some respects it was an advanced design for its time. Its low streamlined silhouette was 3 feet lower than the Grant. At 27 tons its 30mph made it the fastest tank of its class and its cast hull and turret were not equalled until the advent of the Sherman.

Specifications

Power Plant:	Three Perrier/Cadillac petrol engines mounted in clover leaf with total output of 397 bhp.
Speed:	30 mph.
Armament:	2 pounder Quick Firing Gun and .303 Vickers machine gun coaxially mounted in turret. Hull mounted .303 inch Vickers machine gun.
Crew:	5. Commander, Gunner, Loader, Driver, Hull Gunner.
Weight:	27 tons.
Armour:	70 mm.
Designed:	Australia 1941.

Centenary Anniversary of Dr Bean's Birth

● An exhibition to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of Dr C. E. W. Bean was opened at the Australian War Memorial on November 19, 1979 by the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr R. J. Ellicott. The opening ceremony was attended by Mrs Effie Bean, widow of Dr Bean, Mr Angus McLachlan, one of his closest friends, Sir Thomas Daly and other present and former Trustees. The exhibition included books, letters, diaries and photographs from the Bean papers and relics such as Dr Bean's typewriter, uniform and medals. The medals constitute a significant addition to the collections and were donated by Mrs Bean.

MEMBERS WANTS AND QUERIES

WANTED: Hat badge — Goldields WA Infantry Regt. Hat badge — unofficial Camel Corps, WW1. Vietnam items — South Vietnamese, Australian, Korean,Thai, Philippines, U.S., Viet Cong and NVA. Head-dress, cloth and metal insignia, flags, uniforms, documents and weapons. P. Aitken, 16 Graham Place., Box Hill, Vic. 3128.

WANTED: A limber of a 25-pdr gun (British pattern) and a Bren Gun Carrier. W. Bell, 64 Aralia St., Nightcliffe, Darwin 5792.

WANTED: 12 vols Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18. Vols VIII and IX as above. G. Wilson, 22 Old Dookie Rd., Shepparton, Vic 3630.

WANTED: 40th Derwent Regt., hat and left collar. 9th Bn hat. 51st Far North Qld right collar. Aust Horse right collar. RNSW Lancers collar (elephant head facing left). Victorian Scottish hat. 38th Bendigo Regt hat and collar. All badges QEII. R. W. Elliott, 210 Darcy Rd., Seven Hills, 4170.

WANTED: *Sabretache* copies: Vol 6 No 3, Jan 64; all Vol 13; Vol 14 No 1 and 2. K. R. White, PO Box 67, Lyneham, ACT 2602

QUERY: Can any member advise who wore the following shoulder titles — QHG: QUSI: AAS: TPF: AVR: VCT. Bob Gray, 5 Elder Terrace, Glengowrie, S.A. 5044.

QUERY: Can anyone please tell me who wore the following items: Badge — A Maltese cross surmounted with a King's crown. Below the cross is a light infantry horn. Below this is an emu within a wreath. Below the emu is the motto *Nec Aspera Terrent.* The badge is in green enamel and gold. It was made in Melbourne. Belt Clasp — A round clasp with the motto *Nel Desperandum* and *Victoria* around the circle of the clasp. In the centre is a Queen Victoria crown. The clasp is in white metal. Can anyone give me a full list of badges and shoulder titles worn (nor merely approved) by CMF during 1912-18. Bob Gray, 5 Elder Terrace, Glengowrie, SA 5044.

FROM THE SECRETARY

Annual Elections for Federal Council

Elections for officers of Federal Council are to be held by July 1, 1980. Nominations are sought for the following positions:

President
Vice-President
Secretary
Treasurer

Only financial members may be nominated, and their consent, in writing, to the nomination must be forwarded to reach the Secretary by April 30, 1980.

The results of the elections will be declared at the 1980 Annual General Meeting of the Society which will be held at RSL Headquarters, Campbell, A.C.T., on Monday July 21, 1980.

Although the present members of Federal Council were only elected in September, 1979, the elections are being brought forward in 1980 to July to coincide with the presentation of the Treasurer's Report for the financial year.

Branch News

Albury/Wodonga.

Mr R. B. Wiltshire has been elected Branch Secretary.

The Branch is also co-operating with members of 8/13 Victorian Mounted Rifles in an effort to establish a Light Horse Unit.

THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA

THE aims of the Society are the encouragement and pursuit of study and research in military history, customs, traditions, dress, arms, equipment and kindred matters; the promotion of public interest and knowledge in these subjects, and the preservation of historical military objects with particular reference to the Armed Forces of Australia.

ORGANISATION

The Federal Council of the Society is located in Canberra.

The Military Historical Society of Australia has branches in Brisbane, Canberra, Albury-Wodonga, Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide and Perth.

Details of meetings are available from Branch Secretaries whose names and addresses appear on page 2.

SABRETACHE

The Federal Council is responsible for the publication quarterly of the Society Journal, "Sabretache," which is scheduled to be mailed to each member of the Society in the last week of the final month of each issue.

Publication and mailing schedule dates are:

January—March edition mailed in the last week of March.

April—June edition mailed in the last week of June.

July—September edition mailed in the last week of September.

October—December edition mailed in the last week of December.

ADVERTISING

Society members may place, at no cost, one advertisement of approximately 50 words in the "Members Sales and Wants" section of each edition of the Journal.

Commercial rates of advertising are available on request from the Honorary Secretary.

Advertising material must reach the Secretary by the following dates:

1 January for January—March edition.

1 April for April—June edition.

1 July for July—September edition.

1 October for October—December edition.

QUERIES

The Society's honorary officers cannot undertake research on behalf of members.

However, queries received by the Secretary will be published in the "Queries and Notes" section of the Journal.

SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS

Society publications advertised in "Sabretache" are available from:

Mr K. White,
P.O. Box 67,
Lyneham, A.C.T. 2602.

Orders and remittances should be forwarded to this address.

THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA

PLEASE ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE

THE FEDERAL SECRETARY
P.O. Box 30
GARRAN
A.C.T. 2605 AUSTRALIA

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

I/We .....of .....
(Name, Rank, etc.) (Address)

hereby apply for membership of the MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY of AUSTRALIA. I/We agree to abide by the Rules, etc., of Society and wish to be admitted as a Branch member of the .....
Branch, Corresponding Member, Subscriber to Sabretache.

(Strike out non applicable alternatives.)

My main interests are .....

.....

I/We enclose My/Our remittance for $15.00 (Aust), being annual subscription, due 1st July each year.

.....
Applicant's Signature

N.B. (1) Regular Branch meetings are held in Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide and Perth.

(2) Overseas Applicants are advised that subscription is $15.00 Australian. Airmail delivery of Sabretache available for additional sum of $10.00 Australian.